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COURT'SANS A-IR TO GLOBALIZATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the World Trade Organization (\VTO) meeting in Seattle in 
December of 1999, a fe\v dozen self-proclaimed anarchists smashed shop 
\vindo\vs and looted do\vnto\vn locations of major international chains such 
as Starbucks and The Gap.1 While most observers properly condemned 
such antics, the attention paid to these riots obscured the significance of the 
peaceful protests that dre\v more than thirty thousand to Seattle.2 This 
eclectic group of demonstrators, comprised of environmentalists, blue-
collar union \VOrkers and their leaders, and the religious "Roman Catholic 
nuns and priests, liberal Protestants, progressive evangelicals, Je\VS and 
Buddhists"- expressed concern at the gro\ving po\ver of the \VTO and 
other unelected international organizations.3 
Globalization, the effects of\vhich inspired the demonstrations in Seat-
tle, shapes the post-Cold War \Vorld. Journalist Thomas Friedman defined 
globalization as the \Vorld\vide "inexorable integration of markets, nation-
states and technologies" driven by free-market capitalism and having a 
\videspread homogenizing effect on cultures.4 Along \Vith other kinds of in-
tegration comes a demand for the integration of la\VS.s Yet, as Friedman 
observes, \vhile globalization enables nations to innovate and thrive, it also 
produces a po\verful backlash from those \vho are left behind by the ne\v in-
ternational system. 6 
Many Americans are troubled by the authority of entities such as the 
WTO, \Vhich has promulgated rules on a broad range of important issues 
• Thanks to Professor Steven Calabresi, Aaron Kirk, David Fink, and Hillary Krontz. 
1 Timothy Egan, Talks and Turmoil: Tlte Yiole11ce,· Black /.I asks Lead lo Pointed Fingers in Seallle., 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at AI. 
2 /d. 
3 Diane Butler Bass, Religious Join Global 'Greens'; Anolher IYTO Lesson, SEAIILE POST-INIEL-
LIGENCER, Jan. 7, 2000, atA13. 
4 THO~tAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 9 {2d ed. 2000). This book provides an 
excellent, if overly optimistic, introduction to glob3lization. 
s See infra subpart II. C. 
6 FRIED~fAN, supra note 4, at 9. 
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since it was created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1994.7 These concerns are not based on irrational fears of 
worldwide tyranny under the United Nations enforced by black helicopters. 
Rather, they result from a sense of powerlessness amid the perception that 
important decisions are being made farther and farther away from local and 
democratically accountable governments. Wharton School globalization ex.-
pert Stephen J. Kobrin put it this way: "When all politics is local, your vote 
matters. .But when the power shifts to these transnational spheres, there are 
no elections and there is no one to vote for.';8 
At least ostensibly, the agreements binding the United States to sweep .. 
ing international rules and regulations are treaties. The Constitution vests 
with the president and the Senate the power to make treaties, and it requires 
two-thirds of the Senate to approve any treaty.9 Only recently, however, 
have treaties begun to regulate matters previously thought to be entirely 
domestic. 10 At the same time, recent developments have virtually elimi-
nated the states' role in treaty-making, as the president only rarely consults 
the Senate when treaties are negotiated, and Congress ignores the two-thirds 
requirement when it approves agreements such as the GA rr· through ordi-
nary legislation. 11 A clear trend has emerged: the concentration of deci-
sion-making power in the_ hands of the national government, and even 
international bodies, at the expense of state governments. 
Nevertheless, as the centrip.etal force of globalization pulls nations' 
laws toward a worldwide standard, another trend in the United States pulls 
in the opposite direction the Supreme Court's recent revival of federalism 
limitations on the power of the national govemment.12 Several months be-
7 The \VTO was created after the Uruguay Round of negotiations of the General Agreement on Tnr• 
iffs and Trade (GA TI). See Final Act Embodying Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Tmde 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOl. 1 (1994); 
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994). The WTO is, in part, a dispute settlement body that adjudicates trade dis-
putes among nations and passes judgment on national laws relating to tmde. See id. One of the objec· 
tions to the latest GAIT agreement is_ that it imposes standards on various state regulatory powers-
such as banking, insurance, and local tax-breaks and incentives that have been useful for policy ex· 
perimentation. See infra subpart II.C. For detailed descriptions of the WTO dispute resolution system 
and its potential jurisdictional reach, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATr/\VTO OJSPUTB 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (1996); Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International 
Trade Relations, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 775 (1996-97); Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Obloff. 
uconstitutionalization II and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Compc· 
tence, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 424 (1999). 
8 FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 191. 
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.. 2. 
10 See infra subpart ILC. 
11 See infra subpart II.B (explaining the declining role of states in treaty making)~ infra notes JS-52 
and accompanying text (describing how states were originally thought to have a role in treaty making). 
12 Federalism addresses the amount of power respectively allocated to the states and the national 
government. The Court's federalism jurisprudence is discussed in Part III. The Court's revival of fed· 
eralism has generated a tremendous amount of scholarship. For an excellent, concise source of argu· 
ments for and against federalism, see DAVID SHAPJRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 122•23 (1994). 
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fore the Seattle riots, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Alden v. Alaine articu-
lated a broad frrutte\vork for this "ne\V federalism," \Vhich had begun in the 
early 1990s.13 In Alden, a five-member majority-Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and O'Connor- held that Congress 
may not, pursuant to any of its po\vers under Article I of the Constitution, 
subject a state against its \viii to a la\vsuit by a citizen. 14 In \Vords that 
\Vould have cheered the Seattle demonstrators, Justice Kennedy \vrote that 
the people, in establishing the constitution as a federal system, rejected the 
idea that the '\viii of the people in all instances is expressed by the central 
po\ver, the one most remote from their contro1."15 
In 1999, the same majority also severely constrained the ability of 
Congress to subject states to such suits pursuant to its po,ver under Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment even \vhen an ann of the state partici-
pates in the marketplace as a business. 16 In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary• 
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court held that the 
State of Florida could not be sued for patent infringement \Vhen a Florida 
state ,ency used a means of college financing patented by a private com-
pany.1 In a companion case, College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Some recent advocates of a strong judicial role in enforcing federalism believe thnt federal courts should 
eschew bright-line rules in favor of stringent revie\v of the legislative process to nuke sure thJt Congress 
gave sufficiently serious attention to federalism concerns. See Stephen GardbJwn. Rclhinking Constitu-
tional Federalism, 14 TE.x:. L. REv. 795 (1996); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and LimiiS of 
Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HAR.v. L. REv. 2181 (1998). Jackson b:Jie\·es thJt courts should miC\v 
"the adequacy of congressional process to justify assertions or federnl power." Jackson. supra. ell 2258. 
Gardbaum believes that courts should police "Congress's delibemtivc processes and its reasons for regulat-
ing" to make sure that the federal government action has been adequately justified. Gardblum, supra, at 
799. As Part II explai~ however, the Treaty Power presents a unique problem that ~Us for more rigid en. 
forcement of federalism limitations by the Court. In addition, the Court's most retcnt federalism decisions 
set down exactly the kind of bright-line rules rejected by Jackson and Gardbaum. See Infra Pan Jll. 
13 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that l\1aine state probation officers could not sue the state in ~1aint 
courts for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Sb.ndards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216{b). 203(xJ); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (declaring invalid a statute caJ1UlUJldeering stltc c:<ccuti\·e of. 
ficials); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (placing limits on Congress's pow·er to~~ civil 
rights legislation under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Trib~ of Fla.\'. Florida. 517 U.S. 44 
(1996) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the pO\Vet to oven ide states' Elt\·cnth 
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court); New York v. United States. SOS U.S. 44 (1996) {holding 
that Congress may notforce aHstate legislature to choose bet\vecn adopting federal regulations or tt~ng tide 
of toxic waste); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking do\\11 a ponion of the Gun Free 
Schools Act as exceeding Congress•s po\ver under the Commerce Clause). 
14 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712; see also discussion infra Part IL 
IS /d. at 759. 
16 See Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. E.~pense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (striking 
down federal unfair competition legislation as applied to states because it \\':IS not mnediaJ, as required by § 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. E."tpensc Bd. v. CoJI. Sav. Bank. 527 
U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Florida cannot be sued for alleged pltent infringement resulting from the~~­
tions of a state agency in using a patented methodology for calculating mnounts to be pJid under annuity 
contracts to finance college expenses). 
17 H Fla.. Prepaid, 521 U.S. 627. 
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Postsecondary Education Expense Board, the Court held that Florida did 
not waive its sovereign immunity when an ann of the state allegedly en-
gaged in ·unfair competition by misrepresenting its own program. 18 
In 2000, the Court continued to enforce federalism limitations with a 
vengeance. In Kimel v . . Florida Board of Regents, the Court struck down a 
provision of the. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 that enabled 
state employees to sue states, holding that Congress lacked the po\ver to ab-
rogate state sovereign immunity, even under the Fourteenth Amendment.19 
In United States v. Morrison, the Court sent the message that Congress's ex-
ercise of the cotnmerce power must correspond at least loosely with interstate 
commerce by striking down the Violence Against Women Act (VA W A), 
which created a cause of action in federal courts for crimes of violence moti-
vated by gender?0 The Morrison decision is especially significant becaus.e it 
reaffinns the case that started it all United States v. Lopez. 21 Lopez repre-
sented the first time in nearly sixty years that the Court struck down a stat-
ute as exceeding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.22 
So far, the treaty power remains untouched by the Court's new federal-
ism. Since the Supreme Court's 1920 decision in Missouri v. Ho/land,23 
most scholars have assumed that the treaty power is not limited by concerns 
of federalism.24 According to the prevailing view, the president and the 
18 . . Col/. Sav. Bank, 521 U.S. 666. 
19 120 S. Ct. 631, 650 (2000). 
20 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). 
21 . . . 514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
22 The last time the Court had struck down a federal statute as exceeding the commerce power was 
in Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 316 ( 1936) (holding that a statute regulating coal industry labor 
practices governed mining and ·production, not commerce). 
23 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding a treaty with Great Britain regulating the hunting of-migratory birds, 
even .though Congress may have lacked the power to regulate the matter under its Article I powers). 
24 See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LA \V OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. 
e (1987) (hereinafter REsTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Although the Restatement position rcfl.ects the majority 
view, it is not without its critics. Recently, Professor Curtis Bradley argued that although Missouri was 
easily subject to a much narrower interpretation, subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court and )ower 
courts actually broadened it. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mtcu. 
L. REV. 390, 425-26 (1998). According to Bradley, the expansion of the subject matter of treaties (per· 
mitted by courts interpreting Missouri) is part of an historically contingent twentieth-century "intema· 
' 
tionalist conception'' of foreign affairs that contradicts the design .of the Constitution by rejecting 
federalism concerns. I d. at 391. A return to a ''dualist" conception of foreign affairs would at least rc· 
quire that Missouri's holding be narrowly interpreted. Jd. at 458-59. I agree with this vie\V, and this Com· 
ment is in part an e~ort to bolster the position of Bradley and others through the examination of the most 
recent Supreme Court decisions and the perspective of a conversational model of democracy. 
For some recent .scholarship supporting the prevailing view of the treaty power as unlimited by fed-
eralism concerns, see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 442. 
n.2 (2d ed. 1996); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Co11cernitzg "Self 
Executing'~ and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 61 CHI."'!KENT L. REV. 51 S, 530 ( 1991 ); Thomas Healy, 
Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalis.m and the Treaty Power. 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
1726, 1731 (1998). Healy observes that even the Supreme Court's federalism decisions prior to 19.99 
suggest the Court would overturn Missouri. Nonetheless, he argues that such a decision would under· 
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Senate, acting pursuant to the Treaty Clause, can regulate traditional state 
activities to an extent that Congress alone, acting under enumerated po\vers 
such as the Commerce Clause, cannot. 25 
As long as Congress's Article I po\vers \Vere deemed virtually unlim-
ited from the Ne\v Deal until recently no need arose to test the holding 
of Missouri v. Holland. Ho\vever, the Court's most recent decisions make 
it clear that the comprehensive revival of federalism \Viii continue.26 
Mean\vhile, scholars have proposed \Vays in \vhich the treaty po\ver's 
unique inununity from federalism under Missouri could be used to pass leg-
islation that \vould othenvise be unconstitutional as encroaching on state 
prerogatives. For example, Professor Gerald Neuman has proposed that the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)27 could pass constitutional 
muster as an implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR).28 Similarly, scholars have suggested that treaties 
might be used to outla\v the death penalty and that "federalism concerns 
\Vould prove no bar to the preemption of state la\v" under such a treaty.29 
As the Seattle riots suggest, these issues \viii occupy the attention of 
people other than academics. Rapid globalization makes it all but certain that 
the uniqueness of the treaty po\ver \vill clash \vith the gro,ving legitimacy of 
the "ne\v federalism." This Comment argues that the ne\V federalism should 
prevail. Negotiations in far-flung locations, rather than at to\vn meetings, \Viii 
more likely deten11ine the rights and responsibilities of American citizens in 
mine the ability of the federal government to conduct foreign policy cfrectively nnd would in general b: 
harmful to American interests. /d. at 1749 .. 50. To illustrate, Healy notes that the Vienna Con.,·cntion. 
which grants an alien arrestee the right to contact her home country•s consulate, may connict \\ith stltc 
Jaws. The refusal of local la\v enforcement officers in the United Stntcs to carry out this provision. 
Healy argues, v.·ould endanger American citizens abroad. /d. at 1750.51; Vienna Convention on Consubr 
Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, § I (b), 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
For discussion of a recent case involving the failure to grant rights to a foreign national under this pro\ision 
of the Vienna Convention, see infra notes 230-33 and accomJUnying te.~L Cf. David l\f. Gorov~ Treaty-
Making and the Nation: 1he Historical Foundations oftlze Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power. 98 
MICH. L. REv .. 1075 (2000) (concluding from an historical study thlt fC\v subject nutter limitations apply to 
the treaty power, but state sovereignty limitations probably do apply). 
25 See. e.g .• HENKIN, supra note 24, at 442 n.2. 
26 See. e.g .• Alden v~ 1\iaine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 2QOObb-2000bb-4 (1994). The statute prohibited federal or state regulations that 
substantially burdened the exercise of religion \vithout a compelling government interes~t and then only 
if the least restrictive means were used. 
28 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dintension of RFRA. 14 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 49-53 
(1997); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Dec. 19, 1966, S. ExEC. DOC. E, 95-2, 
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The relevant provisions of the treaty state thilt the right "to manifest (one's] 
religion or belief in worship" is a right that may only be limited \Vhen "necess3ry lo protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals" or "the fundamental rights nnd freedoms or others." /d. at 311. 18(3). 
The Supreme Court had struck down RFRA as exceeding Congress's power to enact c:ivil rights legisla-
tion under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 567 (1997). 
29 Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teet/1 to the Unilcd States Ratification of the Co,,.e. 
nant on Civil and Political Rights: Tlze International Hunzan Rights Conformity Act of/993, 42 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1209, 1213 n.24 (1993). 
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the twenty-first century .. The Court, however, through its power to enforce 
constitutional limitations on national power-while reinforcing the role of the 
states, may provide one answer to the excesses of globalization. 
This Comment briefly recounts the development of the treaty power 
and explores the justifications for exempting it from states' rights limita-
tions, concluding that the holding of Missouri is inconsistent with the new 
federalism jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and that a treaty power ex-
ception_ cannot be justified in an era of globalization. Part II recounts the 
development of the treaty power and the ways treaty making has changed 
since the framing. Subpart II.C describes the expanding subject matter of 
treaties and analyzes examples of proposed and ratified treaties that may 
conflict with states' rights. Part III examines the Supreme Court's new fed-
eralism in light of Alden and other recent decisions, delineating the poten-
tial impact of significant federalism cases on the treaty power. This Part 
concludes that the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence suggests its will-
ingness to ovenule Missouri v. Holland or narrowly interpret its holding., 
Part IV considers the arguments for maintaining the treaty power exception 
to federalism limitations. Finally, Part V argues for the value of judicial en-
forcement of federalism. This Part concludes that, under a conversational 
model of democracy, federalism provides the best opportunity for restoring 
citizen confidence by bestowing respect on state government. 
II. THE EVOLVING TREATY POWER 
The Constitution provides that the president "shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senators present concur.''30 The inclusion of the Treaty Clause 
within Article II gives it special significance: it provides a unique and in-
dependent grant of power to the federal govemment.31 Overtime, ho\vever, 
its uniqueness has increased. From the time of the nation's founding to the 
1940s, the treaty power developed from a rarely utilized mechanism for 
concluding agreements with foreign nations to a potential tool for circum-
venting the limits placed on federal domestic powers. 
This Part describes how the making of international agreements has 
changed since the Constitution was written. As it concludes, the foreign af-
fairs power of the national government continues to encroach on traditional 
state prerogatives and to oveiWhelm the protections provided for the states 
by the text ofthe Constitution. Subpart A discusses the scope of the treaty 
power, noting that the Court held it to be immune from the Constitution's 
implied limits on federal power. Subpart B discuss_es other kinds of interna-
tional agreements that have begun to replace the formal treaty despite re-
30 U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2~ cl. 2. 
·
31 See Bruce Ackemtan & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 10'8 HARV. L. REV. 799, 808 
( 1995) ("The Founders established a very complex Jaw-making machine: one system for constitutional 
amendment, another for treaty-making, a third for statute-making."). 
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taining the status of treaties. For instance, congressional-executive agree-
ments, passed by simple majorities-of both houses and signed by the presi-
dent, are one means of circumventing the formal requirement of t\•1o-thirds 
majority Senate approval. These agreements reduce the political protection 
afforded the states through their representatives in the Senate. Subpart C 
discusses ho\v the range of subjects governed by treaties exceeds the Frmn-
ers' vision for the treaty po\ver. This subpart explains that treaties are no 
longer limited to matters of extraterritorial concern and discusses some of 
the \Vays that treaties no\V seek to govern matters traditionally thought to be 
the exclusive domain of the states. Ultimately, this Part concludes that the 
\veakening of the states',.jnfluence in the treaty process and the blurring of 
the distinction bet\veen domestic and foreign affairs effectively removes all 
justifications for a treaty po\ver exception from federalism concerns. 
A. The Treaty Polver's /11Znzunity fronz Federalisnz LinJitations 
All po\vers vested in the national government by the Constitution are at 
least theoretically Iimited.32 The principle that national government po\ver 
cannot intrude upon the zone of activity exclusively reserved to the states is 
implied in the structure of the Constitution.33 Nothing in the text of the 
treaty clause in Article II suggests that the national government's po\ver to 
make treaties ·is any broader than its Article I po\vers. Yet by 1920, the Su-
preme Court had declared that the treaty po\ver \Vas uniquely unconstrained 
by states' rights.34 This s_ubpart argues that the treaty po\ver exception \Vas 
a vague, un\varranted departure from the Framers' intent. 
The materials relating to the drafting of the Constitution contain almost 
no discussion of the scope of the treaty po\ver.35 Instead, the Federal Con-
vention debates centered on the process by \Vhicb a treaty \Vould be en-
acted \Vhether the House of Representatives should be involved and \Vhat 
proportion of the Senate should be required for approval.36 Ho\vever, the 
Framers did clearly express t\vo concerns: First, the states should be 
strongly .represented in the process of negotiating and approving treaties; 
and second, the government should exercise the treaty po\ver only rarely. 
The processes for negotiating and approving treaties discussed during 
the Federal Convention reflected a substantive concern for protecting states' 
32 Federalism addresses the amount ofpo\ver respectively allocated 10 the states and the natiorml 
government The Court,s federalism jurisprudence is discussed in Part Ill. 
33 This concept is referred to as ~'state sovereignty federalism:• See infra subpm.III.A. 
34 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920). 
35 Bradley, supra note 24, at 410; see also Shakelford 1\iiller, Tlzc Treaty }.faking Power. 41 A\t. L 
REv. 527. 529 (1907) ("At no time .... did the convention discuss the scope or c.~tcnt of the pO\\·er; it 
merely considered the question as to \Vhere the po\ver should be lodged who should' exercise iL The 
same is true as to the 'Federalist' .••• "). 
36 Bradley, supra note 24, at 410. 
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rights. 37 The Framers selected the Senate, rather than the House, to approve 
treaties because each state would have equal representation in the Senate 
and the state legislatures would directly elect senators}8 The Founders in-
tended that the Senate would not only approve treaties, but also help negoti-
ate them.39 Indeed, they envisioned that the Senate would act as "a council-
like body in direct and continuous consultation with the Executive on mat-
ters of foreign policy."40 Although critics_ of the Articles of Confederation 
had complained that treaties approved under them were impossible to en-
force,41 the Framers wished to preserve the treacy-making process, which 
required the assent of nine out of thirteen states.42 -They accomplished this 
preservation by requirin§ in the Constitution that two-thirds of the senators 
present approve a treaty. 3 
The Framers deliberately made the treaty process difficult because they 
believed that treaties should be made rarely and only for limited purposes. 
Perhaps they recognized the potential for abuse. It was the "prevailinJ.i 
mood at the Convention" that it should not be too easy to make treaties. 
James Madison noted during the debate that treaties had been too easy to 
make under the Articles of Confederation.45 Madison also concluded from 
"a clear and candid view" of the state ratification debates that its partici~ 
pants assumed the treaty power was limited in scope.46 During the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention, for example, opponents of the Constitution argued 
37 Id. at 412. 
38 See~ e.g., Notes of James Madison (Sept. 8, 1787), reprinted in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 507 (Max Fanand ed.,-rev. ed. 1937) [here-inafter Madison Convention Notes]; 
Notes of James Madison (Aug. 23, 1787), reprinted in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION Oft 
1787, supra, at 392-93 [hereinafter Notes of James Madison]; Bradley, supra -note-24. at 412. An early 
draft of the Constitution vested the power to make treaties with the Senate alone. See Notes of James 
Madison, supra~ at 392-93. United States senators have been directly elected by the people of their re• 
spective states since the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendm.ent in 1913. See U.S .. CONST. amend .. 
XVII. 
39 THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 360-61 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 }; Bradley, supra note 
24, at 412. The Framers also chose the Senate to conduct and approve-treaties because its members• six-
year tenus would allow greater long-tenn perspective and also because its smaller size was better suited 
to fast and secret negotiations with foreign nations. See Ackennan & Oolove, supra note 31, at 81 0. 
40 Arthur Bestor. HAdvice "from the Very Beginning, "Consent" Wizen the End Is Achieved, 83 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 718, 726 ( 1989); see also HENKIN, supra note 24, at 177. 
41 See Jack L. Goldsmith; Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs. and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 
1644 ( 1997) ("[S]tate noncompliance with national treaty obligations [under the Articles of Confcdera· 
tion] undennined the national government's ability to bargain effectively with foreign nations.••). 
42 See Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union arts. JX, X; see also LOUIS HENKIN, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 49 (1'990). 
43 See HENKIN, supra note 42, at 49. 
44 HENKIN, supra note 24, at 442 n.2. 
45 See Madison Convention Notes, supra note 38, at 548; see also Quincy \Vright, The Collslilll• 
tiona/ity of Treaties, 13 AM. J. INT,L L. 242,242 (1919) ("The framers of the American Constitution did 
not anticipate or desire the co.-aclusion of many treaties!'). 
46 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 777 ( 1796). 
742 
95:735 (2001) Starbucks and the Ne1v Federalisnt 
that the treaty po\ver \Vould encroach on states' rigbts.47 In response, the 
Federalists assured them that the treaty po\ver had limits. Edmund 
Randolph said that "neither the life nor property of any citizen, nor the par-
ticular right of any state, can 'be affected by a treaty"'t48 Similarly, George 
Nichols reasoned that the national government did not have the p_o,ver to 
enact a treaty "\vhich shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or 
inconsistent \Vith the delegated po,vers. ,;49 After the Constitution \Vas ap-
proved, Thomas Jefferson, during his tettn as Vice President (and President 
of the Senate) \vrote, in a_ draft of the Senate's JJ.1anual ofPar/ianzentalj' 
Practice, that the treaty po\ver should be narro\V in scope.50 As Jefferson 
noted, although the Founders did not agree on the specific subjects to \Vhich 
the treaty po\ver ought to extend, by implication they intended the pO\Ver to 
be limited by other parts of the Constitution. 51 Among the limitations \Vas 
that the treaty po\ver could not extend to "the rights reserved to the states; 
for surel~ ~e Pr~ident and S~nat~ cannot do hJ treaty what the whole gov-
enunent IS Interdicted from dotng tn any \vay." · 
During the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court's decis·ions concern-
ing the treaty po\ver did very little to define the limits of such po\ver; they 
simply confirmed that treaties trumped state la\vs and constitutions, even in 
matters typically regulated by the states. 53 This rule is evident from the text 
of the Supremacy Clause.54 But the Court did not say \Vhether the national 
gavenunent may use the treaty po\ver to supersede the rights of states as 
sovereign entities \Vithin the federal system. The Court did not directly ad-
dress the scope of the treaty po,ver, nor did it definitively say \vhether the 
Tenth Amendment or the sovereignty of the states limits that po\ver.ss 
47 See BradleylJsupra note 24, at413. 
48
- The Debates in the Con~·ention of tlze CommonweJJillt of J!irginia, rcpnntcd in 3 Ewor•s DEnA TES, 
469, 504 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 2d ed. 1888) [hereinafter Y'uginza Dcb3tcs]. 
49 !d. at 507. . 
so See Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliantentary Practice: For the Usc ofthc Senate of the United 
States, reprinted in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY \VRJTlNGS 4201 421 (\'lither S. Howell cd., 1988). 
51 /d. at420. 
52 .. /d. at42l. 
53 Seelf e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham; 100 U.S. 483 (1879) (holdi_ng that a treaty granting aliens rights 
to inheritance takes precedence overan inconsistent state la\v'Jimiting inheril3ncc by aliens). 
54 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution. and the La\vs of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or \vhich sh3ll be made. under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme La\v of the Land; and the Judges in every Sta-te shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing_ in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not\'tithstanding. "). 
55 Bradley, supra note 24, at 418-19. Bradley also notes that none of the lre3lies ehallc.nged on 
states' rights grounds actually sought to regulate the relationship bct\v.cen states and their own citiz~ 
but only ''the treatment of aliens, in return-for similar ~tment of U.S. citizens residing obro:td." /d .. at 
420. But see Sarah H. Cleveland, Tlze Plenary Power Badground ofCurtiss~\'lright. 70 U .. COLOc L. 
REv. 1127,1130 (1999) (arguing that the Court-paid lip service to states~ rights while, in proc1ic~ feder· 
alism placed "few meaningful limits on the treaty po,ver~'). 
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The Court did suggest, however, that such limitations existed, even as 
it continued to uphold exercises of the treaty power. For example, the 
Court_ noted that the treaty power could not be used to change the character 
of a state's government or cede its territory to another state. 56 The Court 
also observed that uses of the treaty power must be consistent "with the na-
ture of our government and the relation. betwe_en the States and the United 
States" and the distribution of powers between them. 57 
With the Lochner Era came an opportunity for the Court to address the 
scope of the treaty power. 58 In 1913, Congress passed a statute regulating 
the hunting of migratory birds. 59 States sued to prote·ct what they viewed as 
their own property, and two federal district courts held that the statute ex-
ceeded the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. 6-0 Since 
a majority of the current Supreme Court also took a narrow view of the 
Commerce Clause,61 the Justice Department felt certain an appeal \Vould be 
fruitless.62 Instead of appealing the lower court decisions, the Wilson ad-
ministration hit on the idea of reintroducing. the statute in the fonn of a 
treaty with Canada.63 The administration successfully negotiated the treaty, 
which the Senate ratified and Congress implemented.64 
In Missouri v. Holland, .described as ''perhaps the most famous and 
most discussed case in the constitutional law of foreign affairs,''65 the Su-
56 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (''It would not be contended that [the treaty power] 
extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the govem· 
ment or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its 
consent."). 
57 Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S~ (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872) {noting that the treaty power may extend to nil 
objects "not inconsistent with the nature of our government and the relation between the States nnd the 
United States"); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840) (observing that the treaty power 
covered all subjects "which are consistent with the nature of our institutions, and the distribution of 
powers_ between the general and state governments"). 
58 In this Comment, I use "Lochner Era" to refer to the tenures of ChiefJustices Fu11er, \Vhitc, nnd 
Taft from approximately 1910 to 1930-during which period the Supreme Court narrowly construed 
the· commerce power and struck down numerous federal statutes as exceeding Congress's Article l pow-
ers. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LA\V 18 (2d ed. 
1998). However, the Lochner Era acquired its name from an earlier case, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1905) (striking down a New York law limiting the working hours ofbakers), which typified the court•s 
' ' 
weU-known intolerance for all state laws regulating industry during this period. See FARBER, supra, -nt 18. 
59 37 Stat. 847, 848 (1913). 
60 See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915); United _States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 
(E.D. Ark. 1914). 
61 . . . . . See, e.g., Hammerv. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
' ' 
62 See HENKIN, supr(l note 24, at 190. 
63 /d. 
64 The treaty was negotiated with Great Britain, then responsible for Canada's foreign relations. Sec 
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, ·u.S.-Gr. Brit., 39 Stat. 1702; Bmdley, 
supra note 24, at 423 n.l88. Congress implemented it in cb. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified ns 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 703 {1994)). 
6s HENKIN, supra note 24, at 190. 
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preme Court upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty.66 Justice Holmes, in an 
opinion noted for its eloquence, rejected Missouri's argument that the treaty 
po\ver \Vas limited by federalism to the same degree as the conunerce 
po,ver: "It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for 
the national \Vell being that an act of Con~ess could not deal \Vith but that a 
treaty follo\ved by such an act could ... . 'trU It \Vas enough for Holmes that 
the Treaty did not "contravene any prohibitory \Vords, in the Constitution.6s 
The implied rights of states did not stand in the \vay; no "invisible radiation 
of the Tenth Amendment'' limited the scope of the treaty po\ver.69 
Holmes's opinion proceeds from the premise that the Treaty Clause_ 
provides a separate delegation of po\ver to the president and the Senate in-
dependent of the Constitution's delegations to Congress.70 As such, the 
treaty po\ver has indep_endent scope. Ho\vever, Holmes did not sketch out 
the limits of this scope. He only \vrote vaguely that, '\ve do not mean to 
imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making po\ver."71 
In any event, Holmes's opinion has been almost universally interpreted 
as protecting the treaty po,ver from federalism-based attacks.72 That 
Holmes considered the treaty po\ver a unique creature can. be gleaned from 
the diction of the opinion as \Veil. Particularly striking is Holmes's em-
ployment ofDanvinian metaphors: he likened the Constitution to an organ-
ism "the development of \vhich could not have been foreseen completely 
by the most gifted of its begetters."73 In deciding \vhich po\vers \'lere re-
served by the Tenth Amendment, Holmes \vrote, '\ve must consider \Vhat 
this country has become."74 This evolutive vision of federal po\vcr con-
trasts sharply \Vith most Lochner Era jurisprudence.75 Even a stubborn and 
back.\vard-looking Supreme Court \Vas \Villing to ackno\vledge that more 
66 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,416 (1920). This case technically dealt \vith the imple· 
menting legislation, not the 'treaty itself. but "if the treaty is valid there C3n be no dispute about the valid-
ity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary nnd proper m~- to c.~ecutc the powCJS or the 
Government" /d. at 432. 
67 /d. at433. 
68 !d. 
69 /d. at 433 .. 34. 
70 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, MtERICAN CONSTlTUTJONAL LA\'/ § 4-S, at 227 (2d ed. 1988). The 
idea that the treaty power is independent of other delegations of pO\Ver to the national government is fur• 
ther discussed and criticized in subpart IV.A infra~ 
71 Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433. 
72 See HENKIN, supra note 24,_-at l90...91; TRIBE, supra note 70, nt 227; Healy, supra note 24., ot 1731. 
73 Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433'. 
74 /d. at 434. 
75 See FARBER, supra note 58, at 18 ("[The Lochner Ero] \WS a mther dreary [period] in the Coun's 
history, dominated as it was by Justices nostalgic for the JetTersonian America of small fann~rs tu1d 
craftsmen:' But Holmes, in contrast to most of his colleagues, defended the rights or ustates and the 
federal government to experiment with novel fonns of market regulation.}. \'/hat is csp:cially 
noteworthy about Missouri is that Holmes was Qble to persunde his eoUe:1gucs to support a broJ.der rotc 
for the national government where the treaty power \vas concerned. 
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flexibility is required when interpreting foreign affairs provisions of the 
Constitution than when interpreting domestic ones.76 While some scholars-
-have concluded that the treaty power had always been broader than Con-
gress's Article I powers,77 Holmes's description in Missouri of a changing 
Constitution seems inconsistent with this view. As the nation evolves, 
Holmes's opinion declared, so evolves the treaty power. 
Since Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court has provided some clues 
as to the limits of the treaty power. From Reid v. Colvert, a 1957 decision 
concerning the trial of the wives of two U.S. servicemen on military bases, 
most scholars have concluded that the specific provisions of the Constitution 
that place explicit limitations on federal power also limit the treaty power.78 
Other "remnants'' of state sovereignty in the face of the treaty power in-
clude states' rights not to have their territory ceded to a foreign country and 
the guarantee of a republican form of govemment.79 Even so, . the Supreme 
Court has never held a treaty provision to be unconstitutional. 80 
The Missouri decision caused such concern that its critics made a serious 
attempt during the 1950s to override it with a constitutional amendment.81 
Proponents of the "Bricker Amendment" feared that U.S. ratification of sev-
eral proposed international human rights treaties could be used to enact civil 
rights legislation that would circumvent the ordinary legislative process and 
supplant state laws.82 The Bricker Amendment would have subjected treaties 
to the same limitations as any other piece of legislation.83 
The Bricker Amendment failed, and the controversy surrounding it and 
Missouri v. Holland faded,84 in part because the. supporters of the amend-
ment managed to persuade the Eisenhower administration not to become a 
party to the human rights treaties.85 More significantly, by this time the Su-
preme Court was recognizing increasingly expansive domestic federal 
76 Here I imitate Laurence Tribe's observation about the separation of powers. See TRIBE. supra 
note 70, at 211 ("The Constitution's separation of powers and its arrangement of checks and balances 
are less precise [in matters of foreign affairs] than a survey of the text mightsuggest.,). 
77 See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 55, at 1129-30 (arguing that the Supreme Court had imposed 
fewer federalism limits on the treaty power from the beginning); Go love, supra note 24* at 1079-80 (nr· 
guing that Missouri did not descend "like a bolt oflightning out or a clear blue s,ky"}. 
7
·
8 See Reid v. Colvert, 354 U.S. l (1957) (holding that a defendant's right to trial by jury under the 
Sixth Amendment cannot be abrogated by the-terms of a treaty); see also HENKIN, supra-note 24, at 185. 
79 See .HENKIN, supra note 24, at l93. 
80 ld. 
81 Senator Bricker ofOhio and Frank Ho1man of the American Bar Association mobilized the effort. 
See Bradley; supra note 24, at 426-27. 
82 See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification ofHuman Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 
·g9 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 348-49 ( 1995). 
83 The amendment provided that "[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States 
only through legis]ation which would be. valid in the absence of a treaty." S. REP. No. 83-412, at 1 (1953). 
84 Bradley, supra note 24, at 427. 
85 See id. at 428. 
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power.86 As Congress's Article I po\vers increased, a broad treatypo\verno 
longer seemed exceptional. 87 The Ne\v Deal jurisprudence rendered Mis-
souri largely academic until the 1990s, \vhen the Court revived federalism 
limitations on the commerce po\ver \Vith Lopez. 
Developments in \Vorld affairs after the Ne\v Deal also diminished the 
importance of Missouri. During World \Var II, the Roosevelt administra-
tion \Vas compelled to use international agreements that hnd the effect of 
treaties, but did not require the arduous treaty-approval process. Subpart B 
considers these international agreements. 
B. Alternatives to tlze Treaty Pon'er 
In the years after Missouri v. Ho-lla1zd legitimized a uniquely broad 
scope for the treaty po\ver, another significant change further \veakened the 
states' influence in treaty making. Increasingly, the federal gover1unent by-
passed the textually mandated constitutional process for ratifying treaties.-
negotiation by the president \vith approval by t\vo-thirds of the Senate rand 
instead adopted congressional-executive agreements, \Vhich require only a 
simple majority vote in each house and the signature of the president.85 
This subpart discusses the increasing use of these agreements. It concludes 
that \videspread circumvention of the treaty clause further diminishes state 
involvement in the treaty approval process and undertnines the argument 
that the process provides political protection for the states. 
The rise of the ~ongressional-executive agreement res~lted _indirectl~ 
from the Senate's fatlure to approve the Treaty of Versatlles tn 1919. 9 
From the time of the Founding until the 1930s, most scholars and officials 
thought the Senate possessed exclusive po\ver to approve lasting interna-
tional agreements.90 President Monroe felt it necessary to seek t\vo-thirds 
Senate approval \vhen he completed an agreement 'vith Britain to demilita-
rize the Great Lakes after the War of 1812.91 Even though later presidents 
conducted stop-gap executive agreements and military arrangements \Vith 
other nations, foreign governments understood that they \Vould have to in-
sist on a treaty if they \Vished to bind the United States_ govemm_ent beyond 
the length of any particular administration.92 · 
86 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta 1\iotel, Inc. v. United Stntes, 379 U.S. 241,257-58 (1964): \'lickm"d v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942);. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113·17 (1941); see also 
Acket1nan & Go love, supra note 11, at 857 (making a similar point). 
87 TRIBE, _supra note 70, at 227 {"The Supreme Court ••• _has so broadened the scope of Congress' 
constitutionally enumerated powers as to provide ample basis for most imaginable legislative e~ct• 
ments quite apart from the treaty power.'"). 
88 See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note24, § 303 cmt. e. 
89 Ackennan & Oolove, supra note 31, at 802. 
90 
' d 08 See i . at 8_ • 
91 See id. at 816-17. 
92 See id .. at 816,823-24. 
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However, when the Senate failed to approve the Treaty of Versailles 
despite the support of a majority of Senators, criticism of the difficult con-
stitutional treaty approval process grew~93 By the time World War II broke 
out, the Senate's rejection of the League of"Nations ''becam.e a symbol of 
isolationist irresponsibility."94 Momentum began to build for a constitu-
tional amendment to strip the Senate of its treaty-making prerogative.95 In 
1945, the House approved such an amendment, but President Roosevelt de-
clined to pursue it in the Senate because he did not want to risk losing Re-
publican support on other issues.96 Nonetheless, scholars Bruce Ackerman 
and David Golove argue that World War II marked the same kind ofturnin 
Rather than change the Constitution, Roosevelt simply chose to ignore it., 
In the midst of total war, states' rights seemed_ quaint, and it seemed para-
mount that the president should be able to make agreements quickly, with-
out mounting the kind of intensive political effort often required to muster a 
two-thirds majority in the Senate.98 
Although treaties are by no means obsolete, and the Senate still occa-
sionally refuses to ratify them, to the great consternation of the president 
and vice-president, the vast majority of international agreements since 
World War II have not been approved by the Article II method.99 Many of 
' 
the most recent, far-reaching international accords, such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement ~AFTA) and GATI, were approved by 
congressional-executive· agreement. 100 Significantly, observers believe that 
if the president had offered NAFTA as a treaty instead of as ordinary legis-
lation, its opponents probably could have mustered the thirty-four Senate 
votes needed to defeat it.101 
However, Congress has acquiesced to this alternative procedure, and 
arguments that congressional-executive agreements are unconstitutional 
have made little headway. 102 The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled 
93 See id. at 861. 
94 /d. 
95 By May of 1944, pons showed that 60% of the American public was in favor of such an amend· 
ment. See id. at 863. 
96 91 CONG. R.Ec. 4,367 ( 1945); Ackennan & Go love, supra note 31, at 866. 
97 Ackennan & Go love, supra note 31, at 866· 70. 
98 See id. at 870. 
99 See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (2d ed. 1995). In 1999, the 
Senate rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which President Clinton had signed in 1996. 
The treaty failed to muster even a simple majority. See Senator Jon Kyl, Maintaining "Peace Through 
Strength": A Rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 325. 325 (2000). 
100 See Ackerman & Golove,supra note 31, at 801. 
101 See id. No fewer than twenty·one state delegations cast a majority vote against the agreement. 
and five other delegations were divided. See 139 CONO. REC. 29,722 (1993). 
102 Since Franklin Roosevelt,s adminis.tration, the Senate has made scattered attempts to reassert its 
constitutional privilege and has on occasion insisted that international agreements ought to take the fonn 
of Article II treaties. These efforts have been a]most unifonnly rebuffed or ignored. See Ackennan & 
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on their scope or limits.103 Most scholars insist, bo\vever, that they have the 
same scope and force as treaties approved in the textually mandated fash-
ion.104 
If this is true, then federalism concerns limit neither congressional-
executive agreements nor treaties. This conclusion should trouble proponents 
of federalism because the practice of congressional-executive agreements cir-
cumvents the special protection afforded the states through the t\vo-thirds ma-
jority Senate approval requirement Moreover, all justifications for the 
uniqueness of the treaty po\ver that rely on the Constitution's text \Vould 
simply be irrelevant It \vould not matter that the treaty pO\Ver is found in Ar-
ticle IT of the Constitution rather than in Article I. Instead, the justification 
for ignoring federalism concerns \vould have to rest on claims that the legisla-
tion in question is of "international concern .. " Yet, the distinction bet\veen 
domestic and international affairs has become virtually impossible to define 
because many current treaties and agreements govern matters traditionally 
thought to be domestic. This development is discussed in subpart C. 
C. The Decline of the Subject-A1atter Linzitation 
Missouri v. Holland under1nined state sovereignty limitations on the 
treaty po,ver. The other significant textual limitation on the treaty po,ver--
the subject-matter limitation has been eroded as \Veil. The enumerated 
po\vers of the national government are limited by the very fact of their 
enumeration.105 For example, Congress cannot use the Commerce Clause 
to regulate matters that do not affect interstate commerce .. 106 Similarly, the 
national govenunent seemingly cannot use the treaty po\ver to regulate mat-
ters of domestic concern. James Madison assured the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention that the object of evecy treaty is "the regulation of intercourse 
\vith foreign nations, and is extemal.."107 
It appears, ho\vever, that modem developments have proven Madison 
\vrong. In recent years, the subject matter of treaties and other international 
Golove, supra note 31, at 900-04. One of the most prominent academic critics of congressional· 
executive agreements is Professor Laurence Tribe. \Vbo e.xpressed doubts to the president nnd the Senate 
about the constitutionality of the legislation implementing the GAIT agreement that established the \'frO. 
See, e.g., GAIT Implementing Legislation: Hearings Before lhe Senate Conun. on Commerce, Science. and 
Transportation, I 03d Con g. 285 ( 1994) (prepared statement of Laurence Trib~ Professor, Harvard Law 
School). For an interesting debate about the constitutionality of congressional-e.x~utivc agreements, com· 
pare Ackennan & Golove, supra note 31, with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Texl and Strucnue Seriously: 
Rejlectionson Free-Fon11Method in Constitutionallnterpretalion, 108 HAR.v. L. REv. 1221 (1995). 
103 See Bradley, supra note 24, at 398. 
104 See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 217, 229; Ackenn:m & GoJovc, supra note 31, nt 80S; Bmdlcy, 
supra note 24, at 398. 
105 This inherent limitation on national powers is sometimes referred tons 66distributi..-c fed~ralis1n." 
See infra subpart III. C. 
106 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,567 (1995). 
107 Virginia Debates, supra note 48, at 513. 
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agreements has expanded to encompass nearly every part of what used to be 
considered the exclusive domain of state law. This subpart argues that a 
"foreign-affairs-only" subject~matter limitation is implicit in the Constitu-. 
tion's grant of the treaty power to the federal government because the Fram-
ers conceived of treaties as laws governing only foreign relations. Even so, 
the national government has increasingly ignored this limitation. This sub-
part explores ways that the treaty power will conflict directly with federal-
ism concerns in the future, concluding that the argument for treaty power 
exceptions resting on a distinction between domestic and international af-
fairs is no longer tenable. 
Some scholars have concluded that the Framers intended the treaty 
power to be flexible enough to ,govern virtually any subject matter.108' As 
Hamilton and others argued during the ratification debates, they could not 
predict in 1789 every future contingency that could one day require a 
treaty.109 However, the Framers scarcely coQld have imagined treaties such 
as the GATT, which function as international legislation binding on much 
of the world, or today's human rights treaties, which seek to regulate a 
broad range of matters traditionally governed by state law~ 110 The Framers 
believed there existed a sharp distinction between domestic and foreign af-
fairs}11 Alexander Hamilton not known to sympathize \Vith states' 
rights believed that treaties were "not rules prescribed by the sovereign to 
the subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign."112 There is 
evidence that this assumption was valid until recently. 113 As late as the 
1950s, opponents of the Bricker Amendment argued that the subject-matter 
limitation on treaties made the amendment unnecessary. 114 
Today, however, most scholars support the view that the treaty po\ver 
has no subject-matter limitation.115 In any event, the ·united States has al-
108 See, e.g., Golove, supra note· 24~ at 1132. 
109 
,See Golove,s-upra note 24, at 1145; Virginia Debates, supra note 48, at 3'63, 505. 
110 See infra notes 12442 and accompanying text. 
111 Bradley, supra note 24, at 411. Zachariah Cbafee notes that "the vital distinction between for· 
eign affairs and domestic matters was taken for granted throughout [the drafting of the Constitution].'' 
Zachariah Cbafee, Jr., Amending the Constitution to Cripple Treaties, 12 LA. L. REv •. 345~ 368 ( 1 952)~ 
112 THE F£DERALIST No. 75, at 450-51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ). 
113 When Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes suggested in a speech to the American Society of In· 
ternational Law that the treaty power might be Jimited to matters of international concern and not mat· 
ters "which nonnally and appropriately were within the local jurisdiction of the states:• his remarks were 
"accepted as authority." See HENKIN, $Upra note '24, at 471 n:87. But see Golove, supra note 24, at 
1290 n.728 (arguing that Hughes's remarks were misconstrued). 
114 See Bradley, supra note 24, at 430. 
115 See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, § 302 cmt. c.; Ackerman & Oolove, supra note 31, 
at 843-44; Damrosch, supra note 24, at 530. The Second Restatement, in contrast, provided thnt the 
treaty power was limited to matters of "international concern" and not matters of a "purely internal nn· 
ture.n See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
ll7{l)(a), § 117 cmt. b (1965). Curtis Bradley critici~ed what he saw as an effort to bootstrap the lack 
of a, subject-matter limitation into widespread acceptance. Its most prominent supporters, such as Louis 
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ready approved or may yet approve treaties and agreements that regulate sub-
jects one thinks of as exclusively local or even personal, from education to 
family life. 
Rapidly increasing globalization driven by advances in technology has 
many salutary effects. Those 'vbo feel they are unable to get satisfaction 
from governn1ent at the national level can seek assistance from the interna-
tional cormnunity. When considering recent genocides in R\vanda and 
Bosnia, for example, fe\v persons \vould doubt that human rights is a matter 
of international concern and, therefore, appropriate subject matter for a 
treaty. As the Restatement asserts, "ho\V a state treats individual human be-
ings, including its O\vn citizens, in respect of-human rights, is not the state's 
own business alone."116 
Ho,vever, the extension of treaty making to traditionally domestic ar-
eas of la\v 'viii be difficult to stop no\v that it has begun. Public choice 
theorists have found that the same forces driving a strong national govern-
ment are also driving trends to\vard the internationalization of la\vtnaking. 
Po\verful interest groups unable to have their \Vay in Congress \viii seek to 
achieve results during treaty negotiations or through treaty-enforcement 
mechanisms.117 No\vhere is this more apparent than in the area of com-
merce. Trade \vorks b-est \vith lo\v barriers. 118 Therefore, el:onomic inter-
ests \viii seek regulation (or deregulation) at the international level.119 
American companies frustrated by federal environmental and labor regula-
tions 'vould much rather see rules governing their business promulgated by 
an entity such as the WT0.120 T\vo scholars, Hannes L. Schloemann and 
Stefan Ohlof4 have already noted that this trend has accelernted during the 
short time the WTO has been in existence. In a 1999 article, they observed: 
The emergence of the \VTO and the experience of the past four years, in 
particular the ovenvhelming acceptance and use of the dispute settlement 
mechanism, have pushed the multilateral trade system to develop into a proto-
supranational structure . . . [that] has been charged \Vith more and more tasks 
and responsibilities beyond its original scope, both by political dec-isions (ne\v 
Henkin, argued for the-change during the \vriting of the Third Restntcment 3Jld then cited to th.e Third 
Restatement as though it \vere black letter la\v. See Bradley, supra note 24, at 432-33. 
·
116 REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24,. at pt. VII,. introduclory note, at 144. 
117 See Bany Friedman, Federalism$ Future i11tlte Global Yillage, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1441, 1445 
(1994). 
118 See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and tile Regulatory State: A GATT~·Eye 
ViewoftheDormant Commerce Clause, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1401, 1401-07 (1994). 
119 See id. at 1446. 
120 During the Seattle protests, labor and cnvironmentllleade~S demanded that President Clinton neg a. 
tiate basic standards for the \VTO, such as the prohibition of child labor. and a pro~ess th3t ,.,. outd cnJb!e 
nations to retaliate against other nations that viol3ted these stnndards. \'lhen the pn:sident propn=-ed that the 
Seattle negotiators take up these topics, the talks collapsed. See Egun. supra note I, at A 1. 
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separate agreements) and by external pressure (the popularity of the dispute 
settlement mechanism). 121 
As corporations gain access to external sources of rules such as the WTO, 
they will grow increasingly impatient with states' laws. 
It should come as no surprise, then, that conflicts between international 
standards and state laws will be felt the soonest in the area of commerce. 
Every state has some form of "blue sky laws" that seek to protect consum-
ers against securities fraud. 122 But the. state securities laws are all over the 
map, ranging from regulations that call for a "hands-off' approach to strict 
requirements that authorize officials to judge transactions on their merits. 123 
The insurance industry, even more than the securities industry, has tradi-
tionally been regulated almost exclusively by the states. Yet the most re-
cent GATT agreement, the Uruguay Round that authorized the . WTO, 
contains standards governing banking, securities, and insurance. 124 The 
Twenty-First Amendment grants states the power to regulate the sale of al-
coholic beverages.l25 Nonetheless, even before the WTO was formed, a 
GATT panel ruled that various liquor taxes and regulations of some forty-
one U.S. states violated the prov.isions of the GATT, and that the Twenty-
First Amendment was no barrier.126 The U.S. government then took steps 
to have the laws changed. 127 The "Technical Barriers to Trade" portion of 
the Uruguay GATT imposes "mandatory measures that re ulate products, 
that, in the absence of overt tariffs, nations will try to impose de facto tariffs 
via strict regulation. 129 One-commentator .properly observed that "[a]t issue 
in the [treaty] ratification process ... is nothing less than federal arrogation 
of traditional state competence in the law governing private, and in particu-
lar, commercial, relations."130 
121 Schloemann & Ohloff, supra note 7, at425 n.l. This article discusses potential subs.tantive limi· 
tat ions on the \VTO enforcement mechanism, particularly the-tendency for nations to use nationn1 secu-
rity as an ironclad excuse for imposing trade barriers. See id. at 425-26. 
122 Friedman, supra note 117, -at 1449. 
123 See Brian J. Fahrney, Comment; State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case for Federal Pre-Emption 
Due to Increasing Internationalization of Securities Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 753, 759-60 ( 1992). 
124 See Friedman, supra note 117, at 1451-53. . 
125 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
126 See Friedman, supra, note 117, at 1462; GATI Panel Report, United States-Measures Ajfcclillg 
Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (1992), reprinted in 4 WORLD TRADE MATERIALS No. S, at 25 (Sept. 1992). 
•n . . See Fnedman, supra note 117, at 1462. 
128 /d. at 1455. 
t29 (" ·a uee l • 
110 Michael P. Van Alst~ne; Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 690 (1998) .. 
The U.S. laws implementing GA TI and NAFT A both respect federalism concerns to a certain extent. 
They both contain provisions for a federal-state consultation process and allow only the national gov· 
emment to challenge a state's law in violation of the trade agreement. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (1994) 
(NAFTA); 19 u.s~c~ § 3512 (1994) (GATT). After all, the \VTO can only punish nations, not states. 
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Fe\v may pause to consider the potential impact even of human rights 
treaties on local la\vs in the United States. There are a number of treaties 
that grant rights that individuals can assert against their O\vn governments, 
in areas such as racial and gender equality, criminal procedure and punish-
ment, and religious freedom. In many cases, international human rights 
standards are higher than those provided by the la,vs of American states. 131 
Therein lies the potential for still more conflict 
T\vo scholars have suggested, for instance, that human rights treaties to 
\Vhich the United States is a party require states such as California to restore 
affirmative action in :fiovernment and education.132 The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 1 \Vhich the United States has signed but not ratified, 
contains a number of provisions that grant rights to education, privacy, and 
even a certain standard of living. 134 Similarly a\vaiting ratification is the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Fornts of Discrimination Against 
Women, 135 \vhich governs family relations, education, marriage, and even 
"sports and recreational activities. "136 Some provisions of these treaties \Viii 
inevitably clash \vith family la\v in the states; at the very least, legislation 
implementing these treaties would greatly ex8and the scope of federal 
po\ver into the entire range of local concerns. 7 \Vhile most Americans 
agree 'vith these treaties' goals, they may not agree that matters such as 
family life and education should be regulated by international agreement. 
As Justice Rehnquist reminded us \Vhen the Court declared a. federal 
criminal statute unconstitutional in Lopez, "[u]nder our federal system, the 
'States ossess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal 
persede state la\vs.. The implementing legislation for the Genocide Conven-
However~ the thrust of this subpart (and this Comment) is that the national go,·emment may usc the trea-
ties and international agreements to circumvent federalism concerns. 
131 See Peter J. Spiro, The Stales and International Hunzan Rig/us Accords, 66 FORDUA~ ~ L. REv. 
567, 567 (1997) ("The human rights movement is no\v turning its nuention to conditions in the Unite'J 
States, and it is increasingly finding instances in \Vhich such practices ran short or international stan-
dards."); Nadine Strossen, United States Ratification of the International Bt11 of Rights: A Filling Cele-
bration of the Bicentennial ofthe U.S. Bill of Rights, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 203,204 (1992). 
132 See Conne de Ia Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: Nmv Treaty Lan• Cot~ld Help Jmmcnse(l·, 
65 U. CJN. L. REv. 423 (1997); Jordan J. Paust. Race-Basal Affimzali,·e Action and lntemational Lal'!l, 
18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 659, 674 (1997); see also Bradley, supra note 24, nt 403 n .. 69. 
133 Nov. 20, 1989, 281.L.l\i .. 1448. 
134 Bradley, supra note 24, at 403 n.61. 
135 Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination Against \'/omen, op~ncd for sig-
nature Mar. I, 1980, S. EXEC. Doc. No .. 103-38, 1249 U.N .. T .. S. 13 (entered into force SepL 3, 1981}. 
136 Bradley, supra note 24, at 403. 
137 See id. at 402-03. Family law is still considered a matter almost exclusively for slnte regulation. 
See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S .. 572,581 (1979) {"'The whole subject of the domestic rem· 
tions of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the Ja\VS or the States nnd not the Jaws or th~ 
United States.'" (quoting In re Bums, 136 U.S. 586,593-94 (1890)). 
138 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S .. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (quoting Brecht v. Abrohamson, 507 U.S .. 
619, 635 (1993)). 
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tion, which was used to prosecute war criminals in Bosnia and is probably 
supported by most Americans, makes it a federal crime to kill or cause seri-
ous bodily hartn in the United States "with the specific intent to destroy, in 
whole or in substantial part; a national, ethnic, racial,-or religious group as 
such.''139 The Second Circuit has detertnined that the provision applies to 
private conduct committed in this country-.140 Treaties such as the Genocide 
Convention will op-en up vast new areas of criminal law for regulation by 
the national government irrespective of federalism limitations. 
In the area of crime and punishment, the United States is perhaps most 
out-of-step with major industrialized countries in its use of the death pen-
alty.141 The Supreme Court has upheld state~sanctioned executions pro-
vided they comport with the Eighth Amendment, and the national 
government probably could not prohibit the death penalty under -its Article I 
. . . 
powers. Nonetheless, scholars have proposed that the government could 
avoid federalism concerns by interpreting the International Covenant on 
Civil and Criminal Rights to require the abolition of the death penalty. 142 
As conflicts emerge between state prerogatives and international 
standards in treaties and other agreements,- the temptation of the federal 
government to resolve disputes in favor of the international consensus will 
be strong. Free trade drives the stock market, and free trade depends upon 
uniformity. As Professor Barry Friedman concluded, "[g]lobalizing pres-
sures . . . are likely to lead to increased calls to eliminate or further mod-
ify independent state regulatory authority."143 
The treaty power has grown far beyond what the Framers envisioned. 
If the majority of scholars are correct and Missouri v. Holland remains good 
law, then the states possess virtually no protections against an exercise of 
the treaty power by the federal government. Therefore, the treaty po\ver has 
perhaps become what the opponents of the Constitution and strong fede-ral 
power feared most an all-purpose vehicle for imposing the will of the na-
tional government upon the states. Under such conditions, judicial en-
forcement of constitutional federalism constraints against exercises of the 
treaty power \Vill be crucial to the preservation of the federal system. 
139 18 U.S.C. § 109l(a) (1994). 
140 See Kadic v. l<aradzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the statute applies to private 
conduct "if the crime is committed within the United States or by a U.S. national"). 
141 Nations and international organizations frequently criticize the United States for its continued 
use of the death penalty. See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson~ U.N. Report Criticizes U.S. for "Racist •· Use of 
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998,_ at Al7 (describing some of this criticism); David Stout. The 
Nation: Do as We Say, Not as We Do,· U.S. Executions Draw ScornfronJ Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
l998, § 4, at 4 (same). 
142 See Posner & Spiro, supra note 29, at J 213 n.24. 
143 Friedman, supra note 1 17, at 1448. 
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III. THE REVN AL OF FEDERALISl\i 
In 1789, \vhen the Constitution \vas \vritten, the \Vord "State" principally 
meant an independent nation or country.144 The Articles of Confederation 
had created an alliance of independent entities, the closest modem analogy to 
\Vhich might be the United Nations.14s Of course, upon ratifying the 
Constitution and joining the Union, the states agreed to cede a portion of their 
sovereignty to the national government 146 It has been the role of the courts to 
determine \vhat amount of sovereignty the states forfeited. 
T\vo terms are useful \vhen discussing the judicial role in enforcing 
federalism. The structure of the Constitution provides protection to the 
states from the reach of federal po,ver in t\vo \vays that are in certain cases 
"mirrors of each other."147 On the one hand, the fact that the Constitution 
grants Congress enu11zerated po\vers acts as a substantive limit on each 
po\ver. 148 If the po\vers of the federal government \Vere limitless, there 
would have been no need in the Constitution to spell out each po\ver. This 
concept is called "distributive federalism."149 On the other hand, the Con-
stitution, and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments in particular, reserve a 
special illlinunity to the states, by virtue of their status as sovereign entities, 
from the othenvise legitimate exercise of federal po\ver. 150 This special 
protection is called "sovereignty federalism."1s1 
The Lochner Era \Vas marked by the Supreme Court's strict enforcement 
of distributive federalism. In a series of cases, the Court struck do\vn a num-
ber of Ne\v Deal statutes that exceeded Congress's po\ver to legislate under 
144 Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: 17tc Proper Textual Basis of the 
Supreme Court's Tenth and Ele1-·enth Amendntenl Decisions, 93 N\V. U. L. REv. 819,830 (1999). 
145 SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 58; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Tlze Consent of the Go•.-erncd: Con-
stitutional Amendment Outside Article J', 94 COLUr-f. L. REv. 457,469 n.37 (1994) (noting that the D:c· 
Iaration of Independence referred to the "free and independent states•• and that the T~ty of P~cc with 
Great Britain recognized the legal independence of individual states). The Articles of Confedetation 
guaranteed that ~'[e]ach State retains its sovereignty, freedom, nnd independence, and every power, ju· 
risdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation e."Cprcssly de1eg3t~ to the United States in Con-
gress assembled." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION nrt. II. However, there is no analogous phrase 
referring to state sovereignty in the Constitution. See SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at SS-59. 
146 See Richard A. Epstein. The Federalist Papers: From PraCJical Politics to High Principle, 16 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 13,20 (1993). 
147 New York v. United States, SOS U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down as unconstilutionalan nttempt 
by Congress to force the state of Ne\v York to adopt by statute a hmrdous waste 3grecment or take 
ownership of its own waste). 
148 See id. at 156. 
149 MartinS. Flaherty, Are JYe to Be One Nation? Federal Power \:f • .. States' Rights•• In Foreign 
Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1277, 1282 (1999). 
150 See U.S. CONST. amend. X {"The powers not delegated to the Unit~ States by the Constitution. 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people. j; Ne.-,• lcrk, 
505 U.S. at 155. 
151 See Flaherty, supra note 149, at 1283. 
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the Commerce :and Necessary and .Proper Clauses.152 But the Lochner Era 
came to an abrupt end after Roosevelt's court-packing scheme triggered a 
"switch in time" that fundamentally changed the Supreme Court's direction, 
pavin9 the way for a .reign of virtually unli~ited fe~eral power yis-il-vis the 
states. 53 For nearly stxty years, the Court dtd not strike down a stngle federal 
statute for exceeding Congress's power under the Conunerce Clause. 154 
During this time, the Court once briefly attempted to rehabilitate the 
Tenth Amendment in National League of Cities v. Usery. 155 The Court held 
that the federal government could ·not regulate the wages and hours of state 
employees under the. Fair Labor Standards Act. 156 National League of Cit-
ies was overruled nine years later in Garcia v. San Anton.io Metropolitan 
Transit Authority, 151 but then-Justice Rehnquist, in a brief dissent, wrote 
that he felt confident the minority view of stronger state sovereignty would 
eventually prevail again.158 
Only seven years later, it began to look as though Rehnquist might be 
vindicated. In New York v. United States, the Court again considered the 
scope of state soverei~cy this time in the context of a dispute about the 
storage of toxic waste.159 The Court held that Congress could not force the 
state of New York into a choice between either adopting federal guidelines 
or taking title~ of the waste and thereby becoming liable for any damages re-
sulting from improper storage. 160 
New York v. United States began a revival of federalism, the strength 
and importance of which did not become fully clear until 1999. The Court, 
usually by a 5-4 margin, recognized a number of state protections from fed-
eral overreaching. 161 Whether the Court held the protection to be grounded 
152 The Court struck down numerous federal statutes regulating industry. See, e.g., A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corpi> v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down portions of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act that pennitted the President to approve a code regulating the poultry industry). 
153 See LOUISE WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS 217 (1994) ("The power of the nation is virtually 
plenary under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause."). 
154 It bears repeating that, until United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the last time the Court 
had struck down a federal statute for exceeding the commerce power was in 1936. See Cnrter v. Curter 
Coal, 298 U.S. 238 ( 1935) (holding that a ·statute regulating coal industry labor practices governed min· 
' ' . 
ing and production, not commerce). 
lSS · . · · 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
156. /d. 
1
•
57 469 u.s .. 528 (1985). 
158 See id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
159 505 u.s. 144 ( 1992). 
160 Id. at 176. 
161 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flqres, 521 U~S. 501 (19-91) (placing limits on Congress•s power to 
enact civil rights legislation under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. Uni.ted States, .521 U.S. 
898 (1997) {declaring invalid a statute commandeering state executive officials); Seminole Tribe of Fla. 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Indian Commerce Clause does not give Congress the 
power to override states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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in limitations on the cotrunerce po\ver, Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, or the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments, it is nO\'l/ clear that the 
cases to ether are more than the sum of their parts. In the 1999 Alden v. 
states' rights grounded in the structure of the Constitution itself. 63 The 
language of Alden, bolstered by the other recent decisions, provides the 
frame\vork the Court could build upon to overrule Afissouri v. Holland and 
impose federalism limits on exercises of the treaty po,ver and congres-
sional-executive agreements. 
This Part examines the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence and ex-
plores some of the ramifications of the treaty po\ver. Subpart A looks at 
\Vhat has emerged as the most po\verful tool for judicial enforcement of 
federalism state sovereign inununity. It concludes that state sovereign 
immunity is the most promising vehicle for the Supreme Court's efforts to 
impose federalism limits on exercises of the treaty po,ver and congres-
sional-executive agreements. Subpart B examines another aspect of state 
sovereignty protection the Court has addressed during the current revival of 
federalism the rule against conunandeering of state legislatures and 
executive officials. Finally, subpart C discusses the Court's effort to revive 
distributive federalism limits and concludes that this principle is unlikely to 
be useful in reining in potential abuses of the treaty po,ver. 
A. State Sovereign Inznzunity 
The federalism protection possessing the greatest potential for conflicts 
with the treaty po,ver is states' sovereign immunity from la\vsuits. Through 
a series of decisions, occasionally overruling prior decisions, the Court has 
developed sovereign immunity into a narro\v, but nearly impenetrable, for-
tress of state po\ver against federal incursions. This subpart explores the re-
cent cases strengthening sovereign immunity and argues that it is the most 
effective means the judiciary can use to limit imprudent exercises of the 
treaty po\ver that encroach on state prerogatives. 
The Eleventh Amendment explicitly provides the states immunity from 
suits "cormnenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign Stnte."'164 
Ho\vever, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the amendment 
means more than its text suggests. First, the Court interpreted the Eleventh 
Amendment to prohibit la\vsuits by a citizen against his O\vn state in federal 
court \vithout the express authorization of Congress. 165 In 1993, the Su-
162 527 u.s. 706 (1999). 
163 See id. at 2268 ("Congress must accord States the esteem due to them as joint pJrticipants in a 
federal system, one beginning with the premise of sovereignty in both the cc:ntrol Go\'emment and the 
separate States.") .. 
JM . U.S .. CONST. amend. XI .. 
165 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
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preme Court overruled a prior decision and removed the possibility that 
Congress could abrogate a state's immunity from lawsuits in federal courts, 
even by a specific exercise of the commerce power.166 Finally, in 1999, the 
Court filled in the last gap in the wall of state sovereign immunity. Con-
gress could not, the Court held, force a state to be sued in its own courts for 
violation of federal statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause167 or for 
infringement of patents and trademarks. 168 The Court also limited the cir-
cumstances under which Congress could subject states to such lawsuits un-
der Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 169 
But much more important for the revival of federalism \Vere the 
Court's reasoning and language. In Alden v. Maine, the most thorough of 
the 1999 opinions, the Court confirn1ed that state sovereign immunity was 
rooted not in the Eleventh Amendment, but in the system of dual sover-
eignty provided by the structure of the Constitution itself. 170 Significantly, 
the case dealt with the same federal statute · · the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) 171 that twenty-three years earlier, the Court had proclaimed could 
not apply to state government workers in the short-lived National League of 
Cities v. Usery decision. 172 
In Alden, a group of state probation officers sued Maine in its own 
courts, alleging violations of the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 173 The 
Court held that the provision of the FLSA subjecting states to lawsuits in 
their own courts was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's powers un-
der Article 1.174 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that the Eleventh 
Amendment was added merely to make explicit a principle the Founders 
had assumed from the beginning, and "Con ress acted not to change but to 
unheard-of proceedings or suits were intended to be raised up by the 
Constitution anomalous and unheard-of when the Constitution was 
adopted."176 Suits against an entity in its own courts were forbidden under 
166 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44. 
167 See Alden, 521 U.S. at 712. 
168 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (in-
volving patent infringement); Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postse.condary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666 (1999) (involving trademark infringement). 
169 See, e.g., Col/. Sav. Bank, 521 U.S. at 672 (stating that the object of such legislation must be .. the 
remediation of or prevention of constitutional violations"). 
170 527 U.S. at 728. 
171 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
216(b ), 203{x) { 1994 and supp. IV)). 
172 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
173 527 U.S. at 711-12. 
174 /d. 
175 /d. at 722. 
176 /d. at 727 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 18 (1890)). 
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the sovereign immunity assumed by the Cro\vn under En~dish La\v and by 
the states themselves when the Constitution \Vas ratified. rrr 
Beyond recognizing the sovereign immunities observed at the time of 
the Founding, ho\vever, the Court insisted that the principles of federalism 
embedded in the Constitution required that the dignity of the states be pro-
tected.178 Justice Kennedy \vrote that, 
[a]lthough the Constitution grants broad po,vers to Congress, our federalism re-
quires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent \Vith their status as 
residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation .•.. 
• • • • 
... When Congress legislates in matters affecting the States~ it may not 
treat these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corporations.17 
When the other federalism decisions of recent years are taken together 
and vie\ved in light of this language, it becomes clear that the Court in-
tended to do much more than salvage an iota of state dignity from the 
'vreckage left by untrammeled federal po,ver. Rather, it desired to restore 
an appropriate balance to the federal-state relationship. 
At least one \vrinkle remains. As subpart IV.A of this Comment dis-
cusses in more detail, the proponents of the treaty po,ver exception assert 
that foreign affairs are peculiarly the province of the national government, 
and thus the treaty po\ver falls outside the ordinary relationship established 
by the Constitution bet\veen the states and the federal government. Under 
this theory, the treaty po,ver is, like the Fourteenth Amendment Section 
Five po,ver, a unique po\ver of the national government that exists outside 
the federal system and is accordingly immune from federalism limitations. 
Ho\vever, this assertion is dubious. For one thing, the treaty po\ver, as 
part of the original Constitution, is logically part of that Constitution's 
frame\vork and therefore subject to the same limitations as other parts.180 
No textual evidence suggests othenvise. In conttast, the Fourteenth 
Amendment \Vas designed by its framers specifically to alter, in certain cir-
cumstances the federal-state balance ofpo,ver.181 Yet, the Supreme Court's 
revival of federalism has not spared the Fourteenth Amendment enforce-
ment po\ver. 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that Con ress has 
gress's po,ver under Section Five has been subject to seemingly conflicting 
177 Id. at 715-16. 
178 Id. at 748-49. 
179 Id. at 748, 758. 
180 See discussion infra subpart IV.A. 
181 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756. 
182 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
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interpretations by the Court. On one hand, the Court has described the 
power as a broad, positive legislative grant by which Congress may intrude 
into the "legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the 
states.''183 While demarcating the limits of Congress's commerce power in 
Alden v. Maine, the Court noted that the Section Five power was broader 
than the commerce power because, by enacting the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the p-eople "required the States to surrender a p-ortion of their sovereignty 
that had been preserved to them by the original Constitution."184 In other 
words, when Congress acts pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, federalism concerns are muted and the interests of the national 
government "are paramount."185 Therefore, the Court observed that even 
though Congress could not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from 
lawsuit through its commerce power, it could do so under its Section Five 
enforcement power.186 
To illustrate the breadth of the Section Five po\ver, the Court bas ac-
knowledged that Congress may enjoin the states from activi that does not 
bach v. Morgan,-the Court upheld as proper Section Five legislation a stat-
ute preventing New York from imposing literacy tests for voting, despite 
the fact that the Court had earlier upheld the use of such tests. 188 According 
to the Morgan court, Congress may "detertnine whether and what legisla-
.. . 
tion is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
its conclusions are entitled to much deference.''189 Morgan led some schol-
ars to ask whether the Section Five power was broad enough to entitle Con-
gress even to overrule the Supreme Court.190 
And yet, what the Court granted Congress with one hand, it has in re-
cent years taken away with the other. As part of the Court's revival of fed-
eralism during the last decade, the Court imposed limits on all national 
powers, eventually including even the Se-ction Five power. In City of 
Boerne, 191 the Court considered the constitutionality of the RFRA. 192 In an 
opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court asserted that Congress did not have 
183 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,518 (1997) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 
445 (1976)). 
184 527 U.S. at 756. 
ISS /d. 
186 See id. 
187 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (discussing the constitutionality of federal bans on voting 
literacy tests). 
188 . . 6 . 66 384 u.s. 41,646-47 (19 ). 
189 I d. at 65 11' 
f90 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERJNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 216 ( 1997). 
191 521 u.s. 507 (l997). 
192 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994). The statute prohibited fedeml or state regulations that 
substantially burdened the exercise-ofreligion without a com,pelling g~vemment interest, and then only 
if the least restrictive means wer-e used. 
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the po\ver to declare the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment or to de-
termine \vhat constitutes a constitutional violation.193 In order to prevent 
Congress from adopting improper "substantive" legislation, the Court must 
independently confirtn that the legislation in question has "congruence and 
proportionality" to a particular constitutional violation.194 
Applying its ne\v congruence and prop,ortionality test, the Court then 
determined that although the RFRA sought S\veepingly to enforce the Con-
stitution's protection of a right First Amendment freedom of religion it 
did not do so by reference to any actual or potential violation of First 
. . 
Amendment rights. Congress's factual basis· for the RFRA, the legislative 
record, only containe~ ~xamfles of laws ~f gene~l applicability that inci-
dentally burdened reltgton.19 Therefore, m enacting the RFRA, Congress 
did not act pursuant to its "remedial or preventive po\ver."196 In addition, 
the Court observed, the reach and scope of RFRA it applied throughout 
the nation and had no time limit far exceeded the scope of the problem it 
sought to address. 197 · 
After City of Boerne, the Court continued to limit congressional exer-
cises of the Section Five po\ver. In fact, it did so even as it declared that 
po\ver to be inunune from other federalism concerns. '98 \Vbert it announced 
its decision in Alden, the Court handed do\vn t\vo other significant decisions 
that served to hinder Congress's use of the Fourteenth Amendment to over-
come sovereign inununity. Both cases involved the State of Florida's effort 
to initiate a_pre-paid college tuition program.199 
College Savings Bank \Vas a Ne\v Jersey chartered bank that, in 1987, 
began marketing and s~lli~io certificates of deposit designed to finan~e the 
costs of college education. The company held a patent on the particular 
method it used to administer the certificates. A year later, Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, an arm of the Florida state gov-
ermnent, launched a similar program aile edly using the same administra-
suit against the State of Florida for patent infringement under the Patent and 
Plant 'Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act).202 
193 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. 
194 Id. at 520. 
195 I d. at 531. 
196 Id. at 532. 
197 /d. at 534-:35. 
198 See Alden,. 527 U.S~ at 756 {observing that Congress may, in some situations pursuant -to its § S 
power, subject states to suits in their own courts) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 44S (1996)). 
. 
199 Coli •. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 671 (1999); 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Snv. Bank. 517 U.S. 627,631 (1999). 
200 .· ColLSav.Bank, 521 U.S. at 670·7l. 
201 /d. at 671. 
202 35 U.S.C. §§ 279(h), 296(a) (1994). This Statute V.11S a C(UJifiC3UOrl Of existing pltent b\V designed 
to enable the enforcement of patent law against state governments. See FilL Prepaid. 521 U.S. nt 670. 
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It also alleged false representations in commerce under the Lanham Act,203 
claiming that the State of Florida had misrepresented its program in market-
ing publications. The Court announced its decision on the first claim in 
Florida Prepaid; it disposed of the second claim in College Savings Bank. 
In Florida Prepaid, the Court held that Florida was immune from law-
suit for patent infringement and struck down as unconstitutional the statute 
that enabled States to be sued for patent infringement.204 The Court's deci-
sion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, built upon the Court's earlier deci-
sion in City of Boerne and held that in order to exercise its Fourteenth 
Amendment power to subject states to lawsuit, Congress must identify 
"with reference to historical experience" a "widespread and persisting dep-
rivation of constitutional rights."205 Although patent infringement by the 
state technically was a ~'taking" in violation of the Due Process Clause, 
Congress had identified no historical pattern of infringement and had failed 
to consider remedies available in state courts. 
In College . Savings Bank, however, the Court found .no constitutional 
violation at al1.206 Florida did not violate due process by engaging in alleged 
false advertising because, as the Court held, there is no recognized "right to 
be secure in one's business interests."207 Significantly, the Court also held 
that Florida did not waive its sovereign immunity when it engaged in the 
business of marketing and selling its college loan program.208 
In 2000, the Court made clear that the new limitations on Congress's 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power applied with equal force in the 
. . 
arena of individual rights. In Kimel v. Florida Board .of Regents, th·e Court 
struck down the portion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) that subJected the states to lawsuits for age discrimination.209 The 
Court had never recognized the elderly as a suspect class, and therefore it 
held that Congress could not claim the ADEA addressed a constitutional 
violation.210 As Kimel and Florida Prepaid suggest, in most situations 
Congress lacks the power to subject states to lawsuits against their will. 
Even the Fourteenth Amendment creates no exception. 
These cases strongly indicate that the Court intends to strengthen state 
prerogatives while weakening federal ones. However, Congress could at-
tempt to circumvent the Court's recent state sovereignty decisions through 
its use of the treaty power. For example, Congress could pass legislation 
203 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). In order to make the Lanham Act applicable to state governments. 
Congress passed the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, 106 Stat. 3567 ( 1992). 
204 527 U.S. at 630. 
205 ld. at 640,_ 645. 
206 . 527 U.S~ at 675. 
207 Id. at 672., 
208 /d. at 687. 
209 120 S. Ct. 631 {2000); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1967). 
210 See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645-46. . 
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making the provisions of a· treaty protecting intellectual property enforce-
able against states in state and federal court, thus getting around Florida 
Prepaid. Several treaties, including NAFTA and the GATT, have provi-
sions regulating intellectual property.211 Scholars have argued that these 
treaties, in light of Missouri v. Holland, could be used to expand federal 
power to regulate intellectual property.212 This po\ver could presumably 
pennit Congress to subject states to la\vsuits against their \Viii. Finally, 
Congress could use existing human rights treaties to enact legislation sub-
jecting_ states to la\vsuits for violations of labor or environmental la,vs, thus 
circumventing the protection provided by Senzillole Tribe and Alden. Like-
\vise, as one_ scholar suggested, Congress could attempt to get around City 
of Boerne by passing implementing legislation for an existing treaty, such 
as the ICCPR 213 
Ho\vever, Justice Kennedy's opinion hints that such tactics \Vould fail. 
In Alden, he noted that the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment rejected a 
proposal to include an exception for the treaty po\ver.214 Thus, the implica~ 
tion is that an exception to state sovereign immunity for the treaty po\ver 
does not comport \Vith the design of the Constitution. And, to the extent 
that Missouri suggests such an exception, the Court \Viii likely overrule it 
B. The Rule Against Conznza11deering 
As part of its revival of sovereignty federalism~ the Supreme Court 
bolstered state sovereignty in another \vay b refusing to allo\v Congress 
Court's recent decisions supporting the anti-commandeering principle, but 
ultimately finds that principle to be of limited utility in addressing the scope 
of the treaty po\ver~ 
In New York v. United States, the Court first began seriously to revive 
the concept of state sovereignty in the context of a dispute about the storage 
of toxic \vaste.216 The Court held that Congress could not force the state of 
New York to choose bet\veen either adopting federal guidelines or taking 
title to the waste and thereby becoming liable for any damages resulting 
211 See generally Curtis A. Bradley, TerritoriallntellecJua/ Proper/)' Rights in on Age of Globalism. 
37 VA.J. INT'LL. 505,546-49 (1997). 
212 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda atiYJPO. 37 VA. J. INT'L L.l69. 422 
n.302 (1997). 
213 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. ExEC. ·Doc. E. 95-2 
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171;-Neuman, supra note 28, at 49·53. 
214 527 U.S. at 721 (''All attempts to weaken the Amendment were defe:Jted. ••• [Congress) refused 
as well to make an exception for 'cases arising under treaties made under the authority of the United 
States.'" (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONGR£SS 25, 30; 477, 499 (1794)). 
215 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (declaring in,~lid a statute comnundeering 
state executive officials); New York v. United States, SOS U.S. 144 (199.2). 
216 505 U.S. at 144. 
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from improper storage.217 The Court concluded that Congress does not 
have the power to commandeer state governments.218 However, it is not 
easy to tell from Justice O'Connor's opinion whether this limitation on fed-
eral power derives from the nature of the Commerce Clause or from the 
Tenth Amendment and state, sovereignty inherent in the constitutional struc-
ture. Justice O'Connor remarked that the Tenth Amendment is essentially a 
tautology in that it reserves to the states (and the people) only that which 
the other sections of the Constitution have not granted to the federal gov-
emment219 This is another way of saying that the limits on the powers of 
the federal government are to be discovere,d by close examination of the 
enumerated powers themselves. Justice O'Connor then did just that she 
proceeded to examine whether the provision of the statute fell within the 
s~ope o! the c~mmerce power. Ultimately, she found the forovision to be 
"tnconststent w1th the federal structure of our govemment."2 0 
However, Justice O'Connor also noted that there exists a symmetry be-
tween the powers_ reserved by the states_ and thos-e granted to the federal 
government one begins where the other ends.. And the fact remains that 
the provision commandeering the state legislature was offensive to the Con-
stitution. precisely because it regulated states as states. As Professor Martin 
S. Flaherty points out, ''the analysis [in New York v. United States] ulti-
mately turned on a trait that only states can possess, an attribute that by any 
other name would still amount to sovereignty."221 The Court's decision was 
not what it appeared to be;· in fact, it was essentially a Tenth Amendment 
analysis dressed up as a Commerce Clause analysis. 
State sovereignty came to the forefront in Printz v. United States.222 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion ·written by Justice Scalia, struck down a 
portion of the Brady Act that required local chief law enforcement officers_ 
to conduct background checks on potential purchasers of fireanns.223 In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court examined historical understandings and 
practices at the time of the Founding, the structure of the Constitution, and 
the Court's ownjurisprudence.224 
Rather than merely looking at the limits of the commerce power as 
Justice O'Connor's New, York opinion had done -Justice Scalia's opinion 
in Printz broadened the inquiry to address the scope of all federal power. A 
look at the historical practice at the time of the Framers, Justice Scalia as-
217 /d. at 176. 
218 ld. at 17$ .. 76. 
219 /d.at157. 
220 Id. at 177. 
221 Flaherty, supra note 149, at 1285. 
222 521 u.s. 898 (1997). 
223 Id. at 902-03" 
224 See id. at 904-18 (examining historical practice); id at 918-25 (examining consti tutionnl struc~ 
ture); id. at 925-33 (examining Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
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serted, revealed no evidence that the Congress could command state execu-
tives to carry out federal regulations.225 In fact, there \'Vas "some indication 
of precisely the opposite assumption."226 Next, the Court looked at the 
structure of the Constitution itself and _found implicit in that structure the 
"residuary and inviolable sovereignty" of the states.227 State sovereignty 
could not be abrogated; even by an act that .might othenvise be per1nissible 
under the Cominerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.228 Jus-
tice Scalia \vrote that "[,v]hen a ~La,v ... for canying into Execution' the 
Conunerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the 
various constitutional provisions \Ve mentioned earlier ••. it is not a 'La\'1 •.. 
proper for canying into Execution the Conm1erce Clause."229 \Vith these 
words, Justice Scalia seemed to go beyond Justice O'Connor's prior explana-
tion for the source of the rule against cormnandeering. 
The Printz Court made clear that the Tenth Amendment created a zone 
of sovereignty protecting the states. Thus, the Court appeared to tmnsfoitn 
the amendment, once a ''truism," into an independent source of state po\ver 
against the federal govenunent. Since Printz applied not just to the com-
merce po\ver, but all federal po\ver, it seems likely that the Court \Vould ap-
ply the same restrictions to the treaty po\ver. Indeed, scholars have 
explored a potential conflict bet\veen the rule against COitunandeering and at 
least one treaty, the Vienna Convention.230 A provision of the Convention, 
inconsistent \Vith the holding of Printz, requires police officers \vho arrest a 
foreign national to allo\v him to consult \vith his homeland's consulate or 
embassy.231 The Supreme Court bas already refused to overtm11 ·the death 
sentence of Angel Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, even though the police 
\Vho arrested him clearly failed to carry out the Vienna Convention provi-
sion.232 This does not resolve the issue, ho\vever, as the Court refused to 
225 See id. at 905-08. 
226 IlL at 909-10 (noting that the First Congress asked for state nssistnncc in detaining federal pris-
oners, but did not compel the states' cooperation). 
121 /d. at 919 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James f..iadison) (Clinton Rossiter cd., 
19.61)). 
228 /d. at 923-24. 
229 /d. 
230 See Neuman, supra note 28, at 52 (arguing that the holding of Pniltz \'tould not apply to cxer· 
cises of the treaty power); Tribe, supra note 102, at 1260 (nrguing that the holding ofNeu' YQrk would 
not ,apply to exercises of the treaty power); c;t Carlos l'ttanuel Vazquez, Breard. Printz. and the Treaty 
Power7 10 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317 (1999) (arguing that a narro\v interpretltion of Print: nnd Nen' tork 
makes exempting the treaty power from their holdings unnecessary). Bur see James A. Deek,en. Note. A 
New Miranda for Foreign Nationals? The Impact of Federalism on lnternalional Trealles rhat Place Af-
jinnative Obligations on State Go-.·ernments in 1/ze JYake of Printz v. United Stutes. 31 V AND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 997 (1998) (arguing that the Vienna Convention cannot create n-c\v "rights:," nnd' there-
fore, the exclusionary rule cannot be applied to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the treaty). 
231 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, S96 U.N.T.S. 261. 
232 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998) (per curiam); sce-gcnera/1)• Vazquez. supra note 
230. 
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hear the case for other reasons and did need to reach the anti-
cominandeering question. 233 
The holdings of New York and Printz prohibited only a particular exer-
cise of federal power: the rare and often clumsy efforts of Congress to 
commandeer state legislatures and executives. Congress has other means 
by which it can obtain the same ends.234 The states must therefore look to 
stronger protections that do not depend on the limits of the national power, 
but rather have their source in powers reserved to the states. The Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence that culminated in Alden and the other recent de-
cisions provides that protection. 
C. A Revival of Distributive Federalism Under the Commerce Clause 
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court finally imposed limits on 
Congress's enumerated powers and revived distributive federalism.235 
Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act in 1990, making posses-
sion of a firearm in a school zone a federal crime.236 The Supreme Court 
held that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate under the 
Commerce Clause.237 In support of its decision, the majority returned to a 
basic definition of "interstate commerce."238 A matter that was essentially 
local,-such as schools, could not be "interstate." A matter essentially non-
commercial, such as the possession of firearms, could not be "commerce.'' 
To uphold the statute, Rehnquist reasoned, would make the text of the Com-
merce Clause meaningless because "[it] would require us to conclude that the 
Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not 
enumerated . . . and that there will never be a distinction between what is 
truly national and what is truly local .... This we are unwilling_ to do."z39 
For the next five years, many scholars wondered if the Lopez Court 
merely meant to slap Congress on the wrist.240 After all, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion noted that Congress had provided no express findings 
regarding the effects of gun possession in school zones on interstate com-
233 See Breard, 523 U~S. at 375-76. 
234 Congress could,-for example, threaten to withhold federal funds if the state refused to execute the 
federal regulation. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding constitutional Congress's 
indirect encouragement of states through the threat of withholding federal funds,_ even where direct nciion 
upon the states would be unconstitutional). Also, the line between commandeering of state legislatures and 
the mere preemption of state statutes by federal statutes can be a fuzzy one. See New York v. United States, 
505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
l3S 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
236 18 u.s.c. § 922(q) (1994). 
237 . . .. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
238 /d. 
239
. /d. at 567-68. 
240 See, e.g., Philip F. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 695, 697 (1996) (arguing that Lopez may be 
defended as a technique ''to encourage appropriate congressional procedures and considerations*'). 
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merce.241 Perhaps that\vas the problem. Ho\vever, in 2000, Lopez doubters 
acquired ne\v faith \vhen the Court decided Ullited States v. Aforrison.242 
That case concerned a provision of the Violence Against \Vomen Act that 
created federal criminal and civil remedies for acts of violence "motivated 
by gender,'' even \vhen the perpetrator of the act did not cross state lines.243 
Unlike the statute in Lopez, VAW A's legislative history contained numer-
ous findings regarding the serious aggregate effects of gender-motivated 
violence on interstate conunerce.244 The Court held the provision unconsti-, 
tutional an}'\vay. Chief Justice Rehnquist, again ''niting for the Court, ex-
plained that Congressional findings of fact \Vere not, by themselves, 
"sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of Cotmnerce Clause legisla-
tion.''245 The connection bet\veen gender-motivated violence against 
\vomen and interstate conunerce \Vas simply too attenuated. If such legisla-
tion \vere upheld, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned, Congress could easily 
regulate not only murder, but marriage, divorce, and cbildrearing as \Veil, 
since these activities had an undoubtedly significant aggregate effect on in-
terstate commerce.246 
One can rec_onstruct the distributive federalism thesis that animates Lo-
pez and Morrison in the context of another seemingly plenary grant to the 
federal government the treaty po\ver. The Court could dra\v a distinction 
benveen \vhat is domestic and \vbat is international, just as Lopez dre\V a 
distinction bet\veen \Vhat \Vas local and \Vbat \Vas national. If the President 
and the Senate may make treaties that govern matters of traditional state 
concern, such as violence against \Vomen, schools, or the possession of fire-
arms in local cormnunities, then the enumeration of the treaty po\ver in the 
Constitution \vould be meaningless. A treaty that mimics the state police 
power is not a treaty at all and, therefore, cannot be constitutional. 
Ho\vever, there are obstacles to translating the holding of Lopez from 
the commerce po\ver to the treaty po\ver. First, the treaty po\'ler may not be 
a delegated p-o,ver at all but, rather,-a po\ver reserved to the federal govern-
ment. In United States v. Curtiss-Wriglzt Export Corp., Justice Sutherland 
\vrote that the treaty po\ver \Vas never an enumerated po\ver because it 
never belonged to the states.247 Second, distinctions like the one Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist dre\V in Lopez are even more difficult to apply-to treaties. 
241 See id. at 562. 
242 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). 
243 . . ' 42 u.s.c. § 13.98l(b) (1994). 
244 See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. 
245 /d. 
246 /d. at 1753. 
247 299 u.s. 304,318 (1936) ("[T]he_ investment orthe fedeml government \'lith the powers of ex-
ternal sovereignty did not depend upon the affinnative gmnts of the Constitution. The powers to deelarc 
and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties. to milintain diplomatic relations \vilh other so\·er-
eignties, if they had never been mentioned in the constitution, \Voutd have vested in the federol govern· 
ment as necessary concomitants of nationality~"). This argument is dealt \'t'ith in subpJrt IV.B infra. 
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After all, globalization means worldwide integration at every level, from the 
economic and political to the cultural and personal. In the age of satellites, 
the Internet, and porous borders, it seems nearly impossible to separate do-
mestic from international concerns.248 As Professor Laurence Tribe ob-
served, "[w]ith global interdependence reaching across an ever broadening 
spectrum of issues," a requirement that treaties only deal with matters of in-
ternational concern is "unlikely to prove a serious limitation."249 
Despite these difficulties, the Court could still choose to demarcate the. 
boundaries of the treaty power. Ironically,. a recent decision limiting state 
prerogatives hints that the Court could treat the treaty power as just another 
enumerated power. In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, the 
Court conside!ed a Massachuse~ Ia~ barrin~ state e?tities from furchasing 
goods or services from compantes dotng bustness wtth Burtna.25 After Ja-
pan and the European Union challenged the law before the WTO as incon-
sistent with U.S.. obligations under its agreement on government 
procurement, Congress passed its own set of sanctions against Burma.251 
Justice Souter's opinion for the Court held that Congress's sanctions pre-
empted the state sanctions and did not need to reach constitutional issues.252 
However, the First Circuit had held that the Massachusetts law violated 
both the dormant Forei~n Commerce Clause and a more general "dormant 
foreign affairs power.'·' 53 The First Circuit relied on an earlier case, 
Zschernig v. Miller, in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional state 
probate statutes restricting inheritance rights of persons living in Commu-
nist countries, even though no federal statute governed the issue.254 Justice 
Souter's opinion in Crosby suggests that the Court is_ sympathetic to the ar-
gument that the Massachusetts law, even absent preemptive federal ]a\v, 
would interfere with the president's power to direct foreign policy and the 
national government's commitments to the WT0.255 · 
Crosby, and the lower court's decision in particular, supports the 
proposition that the treaty power may function like the commerce power. 
Just as the dortnant commerce clause defines the scope of Congress's com-
merce clause power by reinforcing its basis in interstate commerce, the 
dormant foreign affairs power may also define and limit the treaty power by 
forbidding the states to conduct foreign economic policy. Admittedly, 
248 Bradley, supra note 24, at 451. 
249 TRIBE, supra pote 70, at 228. 
250 120 S. Ct. 2288,2291-92 (2000); Peter J. Spiro; U.S. Supreme Court Knocks Dow11 State Burma 
Law, ASIL INSIGHT (June 2000), available at http://www.asil~orglinsigh46.btm. 
251 See Spiro, supra note 250; Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2291-92. 
252 Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2294 .. 
253 See Nat'lForeign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,58 n.14 (1st Cir. 1999). 
2s4 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Spiro,.supra note 250. 
255 120 S .. Ct. at 2298-99 ("\Ve need not get into any general consideration oflimits of state action 
affecting foreign affairs to realize that the President's maximum power to persuade_ rests on his capacity 
lo bargain for the benefits of access to the entire national economy .•.• u). 
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ho\vever, these arguments \viii remain speculative until the Court fleshes 
out the donnant foreign affairs doctrine. Again, it is in the area of state 
sovereign inununity that the Supreme Court has established the finnest bar-
rier against incursions by the national government. 
IV. A CRITIQUE OF TREATY PO\VER EXCEPTION 
The idea that the treaty po\ver ought not be limited by states' rights 
rests largely on the premise that foreign affairs are sui generis, or uniquely 
the province of the national government. This premise yields t\'10 basic ar-
guments for maintaining the treaty po,ver exception. The first, addressed in 
subpart A, is the argument that, \Vith respect to foreign affairs, the nation 
"speaks 'vith one voice." That is, history and necessity both dictate that our 
system of dual sovereignty simply does not exist outside of purely domestic 
affairs. The second argument, addressed in subpart B, reassures proponents 
of federalism that the states still have a voice in foreign affairs through the 
political process, making judicial enforcement of federalism protections un-
necessary. This Part examines these arguments and finds them unconvinc-
ing, particularly in light of recent changes in the treaty-making process. 
A. Tlze "Oile Nation" Argu11zent 
Proponents of the treaty po\ver exception to federalism concerns argue 
that the treaty po\ver is uniquely the province of the federal government. 
This subpart examines this argument and rejects it as inconsistent \Vith the 
text and structure of the Constitution. 
The scholar Louis Henkin has declared that "[a]s regards U.S. foreign 
relations, the states 'do not exist. "'256 He means that the dual sovereignty 
established by the structure of the Constitution does not apply \vhere the 
treaty po\ver is concerned. The states never had "international sover-
eignty," Henkin asserts and, even if they did, they gave it up \vhen they rati-
fied the Constitution.257 The Constitution appears to prohibit the states 
from conducting foreign affairs or acting as international agents. States 
cannot make treaties, coin money, or impose duties or tariffs \Vithout the 
consent ofCongress.258 
256 HENKIN, supra note 24, at 1 SO. 
257 !d. at 19. It is not clear whether the states actually individually possessed .. external sovereignty" 
after they declared independence from Great Britain. Those arguing against e:demal sovereignty point 
out that no colony declared itself independent of Britnin until nuthorized to do so by the Continental 
Congress. See SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 15. Proponents respond that the ContinentAl Congress \vas 
not a political entity, but something more like a "council of states ... /d. at 58. Besides, they argue, even 
the Articles of Confederation guaranteed the sovereignty of the states. See id.; ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. 2. Yet, the nssumption that the States never hJd e:<temJl 
sovereignty is crucial to the reasoning of Curtiss-IYright. Sec infra notes 259-63 mtd nccompJn)ing tc:d. 
2S8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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Even granting that some foreign affairs activities are off-limits to the 
states, it still requires a leap to reach the conclusion that the federal gov-
ernment possesses immunity' from all federalism limitations when acting 
pursuant to the Treaty Clause. A much-criticized 1936 Supreme Court de-
cision, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,259 made that theoreti-
cal leap possible. The case is in some respects the separation of powers 
analog to Missouri v. Holland, but it contains an "essay" by Justice Suther-
land that has implications for federalism as well. 
In Curtiss-Wright, Congress had passed a joint resolution giving the 
president the power to apply a criminal _prohibition on the sale of arms in 
the United States to countries engaged in a war in South America. The 
plaintiff protested that the agreement was an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative authority to the president. In order to respond to what was, at the 
time, a valid legal argument,260 Justice Sutherland drew a sharp distinction 
between the national government's power over foreign affairs and its power 
over domestic affairs. Justice Sutherland wrote that "[t]he broad statement 
that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifi-
cally enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are neces-
sary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically 
true only in respect of our internal affairs."261 Sutherland reasoned that the 
foreign affairs powers of the national government, in contrast, exist outside 
the constitutional framework of power delegations: ''[S]ince the states sev-
erally never possessed international powers, such powers could not have 
been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted 
to the United States from some othersource."262 
Justice Sutherland's national sovereignty explanation for the unique-
ness of the national government's foreign relations powers has been sub-
jected to Hwithering criticism."263 Indeed, it hardly follows that because the 
power to make treaties and otherwise conduct foreign relations is inherent 
in national sovereignty, a treaty impinging on the rights of the states as sov-
ereigns would be pern1issible. The Constitution expressly delegates the 
259 . 299 u.s. 304,315-16 (1936). 
260 The Lochner Em court of Curtiss~ Wright had just struck down New Deal statutes -as unconstitution· 
al delegations of power from Congress to the president. See A. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495,52942 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v., Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,421-30 (1934). 
261 Curtiss-J¥right, 299 U.S. at 315-16. 
-
262 /d. at 316. 
263 Bradley, supra note 24, at 43:8. For criticism of the Curliss-JYright decision, see Michael J. Olen· 
non, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-\Vright?. 13 YALB J. 
INT'L L. 5 (1988); ·oavid M., Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Suther· 
land's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-\Vright Export 
Corporation: An Historical Reassessnzent, 83 YALE LJ. 1 (1973). The reasoning of Curliss-JYriglzt was 
largely rejected by Justice Robert Jackson, who called it "dictum" in his famous concurrence in the 
"Steel Seizure, case. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (19,52) 
(declaring a presidential order authorizing seizure of the steel industry unconstitutional despite claims by 
the president that the order was necessary for national defense) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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treaty po,ver to the national govertunent, just as it delegates the po\ver to 
regulate colllltierce. Logically, then, foreign affairs po\vers should be subject 
to the Constitution's structural limitations. That the states may never have 
enjoyed those po,vers themselves is immaterial. Moreover, the exclusivity 
argument is further \Veakened \vhen one considers that the Constitution does 
pennit states to enter into some kinds of international agreements.264 
In general, proponents of special federalism immunity for the treaty 
po\ver and the foreign relations po\ver also stress the practical side of the 
"one nation" argument: the need for the United States to speak \Vith one 
voice in international negotiations. States' rights cannot be allo\ved to limit 
the scope of the treaty po\ver because, as Professor Neuman argues, 
"[r]equiring the unanimous agreement of ... all the states for ratification of 
any treaty that includes a provision addressing 'local' concerns \vould 
greatly hamper American participation in international treaty regimes."265 
It is true that effective bargaining may often require a single national 
representative \vith the po\ver to make binding commitments. Presidents 
developed the "fast-track" process for precisely this reason.266 Like\vise, 
the Supreme Court has emphasized the need for exclusive federal control of 
foreign relations.267 Ho,vever, examination of the Treaty Clause itself belies 
the notion that the Framers believed states should not participate in the mak-
ing of treaties. Recall that the Framers originally planned to hold the Sen-
ate then the states' rights body solely responsible for negotiating and 
approving treaties.268 Admittedly, the Framers changed the plan to give the 
primary negotiating role to the president because of concerns raised by Madi-
son that the treaty-maker should represent the interests of the entire nation.269 
Ho\vever, the plan still contemplated an active advising role for the Senate, 
and any treaty that survived the process \vould have to conunnnd support 
from 1:\vo-thirds of the "states' representatives," the United States senators. 
Advocates of treaty po\ver exceptionalism \Viii argue that times have 
changed. That, ho\vever, is precisely the point. Treaties no\v govern a \Vide 
264 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (allo\ving st.ates to enter into "Agreement[s) or CompJct[s]" 
with foreign nations with congressional consent); see generally Raymond S. Rodge~ The Cap3Cilj• of 
States of the Union to Conclude International Agreements: The Background and Some Recenl DC\·elop-
ments, 61 Mi. J. INT'L L. 1021 (1967). 
265 Neuman, supra note 28, at 48. 
266 Fast·track legislation allows the president to conclude trade ngrecments subject only lo limited 
debate and an up.ar.down vote in Congress. See generally Harold Hongju Koh. The Fast Track and 
United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J.INT•L L. 143 (1992). 
267 See, e.g., Michelin Tire Corp. v. \Vages, 423 U.S. 276,285 (1976) ("(T]hc Fcderol Government 
must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations \vith foreign governments. • • .); 
Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U,S. 429,436 (1968) (describing &&foreign nffairs nnd international relations" as 
"matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government''); United States v. Belmont, 
301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("In respect of all international negotiations and compJcts, and in resp:ct of 
our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear."). 
268 See supra subpart I I.A. 
269 See A.1adison Convention Notes, supra note 38, at 392. 
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range of matters forrnerly considered to be domestic in nature.270 When the 
subject of the typical treaty was, for example, the resolution of armed con-
flict in Asia, the need for a strong executive authority was apparent. Now 
that a treaty is much more likely to govern, for instance, religious freedom, 
a singular role for the President can be troubling. As Curtis Bradley ob-
served, "[i]t is not at all obvious ... that it is necessary or desirable that the 
country speak through the Executive with respect to the regulation of reli-
gious freedom."271 The states' traditional role in the treaty-making process 
seems more appropriate and necessary than ever before. 
B. The Political Process Argument 
Proponents of a treaty power exception also argue that no substantive 
federalism restrictions are necessary because the interests of the states are 
properly represented in the political process.272 This subpart examines this 
argument and rejects it on the ground that subsequent practices have un-
dermined all of the traditional state protections afforded through the politi-
cal process. In addition, even were such protections in place, the federal 
government would have a natural tendency to aggrandize itself at the ex-
pense of the states. 
Proponents of the treaty power exception point out that the states al-
ready have a built-in voice in the process that produces treaties. After all, 
each state is equally represented in the Senate, and the two-thirds majority 
requirement ensures the consideration of states' interests.273 Critics have 
made similar arguments against federalism constraints on national po,ver in 
general. Herbert Wechsler first asserted such a theory in the 1950s, and 
Jesse Choper subsequently developed it further.274 Justice Blackman and 
four other Justices adopted the theory in Garcia, the decision that overruled 
National League of Cities and pertnitted the application of federal wage and 
hour regulations to state government employees.275 
However, in Alden, the Supreme Court appeared finally to reject ac-
countability as the sole federalism protection. Under Justice Kennedy's 
theory of dual sovereignty, the judicial branch simply cannot leave the 
states to rely only on their representatives in the national government for 
protection. State governments have separate accountability to those they 
represent: "By 'split[ting] the atom of sovereignty,' the founders estab-
270 See supra subpart II.C. 
271 Bradley, supra note 24, at 446. 
272 See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 24, at 443-44 n.4. 
273 See id. 
274 See Herbert \Vechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States In the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); Jesse H. Cho· 
per, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALB 
L.J. 1552 (1977). 
275 469 U.S. 528, 551 n.ll ( 1985). 
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Iished 'nvo orders of goverruttent, each \Vith its O\vn direct relationship, its 
O\vn privity, its O\vn set of mutual ri hts and obligations to the people \vho 
govenmtent and no longer have direct accountability to the governments of 
the states they represent. As scholars have noted, national representatives 
tend to aggrandize the national institution at the expense of state govem-
ment.277 Professor John Yoo observed that members of Congress have an 
interest in expanding the po\ver of the federal government, even \Vhen it 
may not be politically expedient to do so.278 
Moreover, the political process argument is particularly \venk \Vhere 
treaties and international agreements are concerned. As Part I explained, 
the political federalism safeguards envisioned by the Framers for the treaty 
power simply no longer exist, or they have been substantially \Veakened. 
State legislators no longer elect senators. The Senate usually plays no role 
in the \vriting or negotiation of treaties. Moreover, the practice of making 
congressional-executive international agreements, rather than treaties, ig-
nores even the Senate's traditional prerogative. 
Finally, treaties and international agreements such as NAFf A and the 
GAIT are huge documents, and they are even less amenable to clear under-
standing than the most complex federal statutes. They are more likely to 
contain vague or "aspirational" language that is subject to multiple interpre-
tations.279 It may not be entirely clear, either to the members of Congress or 
those \Vhom they represent, \Vhat exactly they have approved. 
The failure of the political process to enforce the values of federalism 
contributes to citizens' discontent \vith that process. Part V discusses the 
reasons \vhy court-imposed federalism limitations \Vill increase citizen par-
ticipation in government and perhaps lessen voter frustration. 
V. FEDERALISM IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION. 
The potential clash bet\veen the Supreme Court's revival of federalism 
and the \veil-established doctrine of treaty po\ver exceptionnlism roises the 
question: Why is federalism worth protecting? Treaties are fast beginninJB 
to resemble international legislation binding on much of the \Vorld.2 
Ho\vever, they are negotiated and \vritten in relative obscurity far from the 
276 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,751 (1999) (quoting Saenz v. Roe. 526 US. 489,504 n.17 (1999)). 
277 See John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Fcdera/isnz in 1/ze 1990s, 32 IND. L. REv .. 27, 
39 (1998) ("As members of the federal government, legislators \vould possess the driving interest to ex-
pand the power of the federal government, even perhaps if it did not benefit them in tenns of po!itiC4ll 
support The founding generation feared that Congress \VOuld seek to grob more power from the states 
in order to enhance its own institutional po,ver, prestige, nnd glory .. "). 
278 /d. 
279 See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Donzestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 A!.!. J. 
INT'LL. 310,339 (1992). 
280 Bradley, supra note 24, at 396. 
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people who must live under their provisions.281 Ironically, in an age of 
globalization, state and local matters grow in importance. As Professor 
Barry Friedman observed, the delegation of power to international organiza-
tions and agreements creates "a strong incentive to reinvigorate state and 
local government . . . in order to return control over other aspects of our 
lives to governments close to home."282 American federalism is a peculiar 
type of localism built into the Constitution.283 The states are permanent fix-
tures in the constitutional framework. This Part argues that federalism pro-
vides the best available basis for restoring a sense of power to individual 
citizens who feel alienated from the decision-making process. 
Increasing reliance on treaties and the executive enforcement of inter-
national agreements weakens chains of accountability and creates distance 
between citizens and the government. As Professor Cass Sunstein ob-
served, "participation is difficult when the seat of government is far 
away."284 Federalism is valuable because it invests local government with 
more power, increasing government's accountability to individual voters. 
However, democracy is about more than just "one person, one vote. "285 
Professor Robert Bennett posited a model of democracy that seeks to ex-
plain why many do not vote and yet feel they participate in the democratic 
process. After all, the opportunities for the individual voter actually to af-
fect the outcome of any particular election are statistically quite smal1.286 
Under a "conversational" model of democracy, ho\vever, citizens value 
above all the opportunity to influence the makers of public policy, not even 
through direct dialogue with officeholders, but because they participated in 
a public conversation that "genuinely entered into the process of give and 
take that eventuates in a decision."287 
By preserving the prerogatives of state government, federalism pro-
vides an opportunity for meaningful involvement in the political process it-
self.288 Voters, for their part, feel that multiple layers of government 
provide greater opportunities to express their views and be listened to. 289 
As Professor Bennett observed, voters feel the political process is person-
ally meaningful to them even when their opportunities to affect policy out-
281 /d. at 442. 
282 Friedman, supra note 117, at 1443. 
283 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 ( 1999). 
284 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1555-57 (1988). 
285 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
286 See Robert Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 481, 487· 
88 (1997). 
287 /d. at 504. 
288 See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1551-52 (1994) (noting 
that disenfranchised groups are likely to work in state government or get involved in state politics as n 
way of gaining power. Minorities are more likely to work in state government or be involved in state 
politics because it is the way in for most people.). 
289 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism; 41 FLA. L. REv. 499,538 (1995). 
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comes are sma11.290 What is significant for most people is that they partici-
pated in the conversation.291 By giving state government its proper respect, 
federalism increases the amount of attention citizens pay to state nnd local 
politics and fosters conversation about politics and public policy at the local 
leve1.292 Giving respect to state government strengthens the sense of indi-
vidual involvement among citizens. 
One of the most difficult problems \vith the proliferation of treaties and 
international agreements is the danger of "one-size-fits-all', govemance.293 
This trend, lmo\vn some,vhat euphemistically as "hannonization,, seeks to 
eliminate difference in localla\VS in favor of \Vorld\vide unifonnity.294 In 
contrast, federalism encourages regulatory creativity, preserving nn arena in 
'vhich states can freely experiment, innovate, and copy one another's suc-
cesses.295 Indeed, there may not be one "right" approach to evety policy 
problem. Even at a time \Vhere there is a Starbucks on every comer, state 
governments still offer their citizens different choices.296 The result is 
greater freedom for the individual ''consumer'' of government, \vho can al-
'vays move to a state more suited to her taste. 
Critics of American federalism remind us that states historically have 
been more likely than the national government to exclude minority groups 
from the political process.297 If localism is really the solution, critics argue, 
'vhy not empo,ver local governments, \Vhere minorities are likely to have 
more influence? The simplest ans\ver is that states are the local entities 
recognized by the Constitution. We cannot start again \Vith a clean slate, so 
290 . See Bennett, supra note 286, at 504. 
291 See id. 
292 Perhaps more than any other recent federalism decision, Justice Kennedy's Alden opinion cnt· 
phasizes respect: ''Congress must accord States the esteem due to them ns joint plrticip:mts in a federal 
system." 527 U.S. at 758. 
293 One of the objections to the latest GA 1T agreement is that it \vould impose standards on \-arious 
state regulatory powers such as banking, insurance, and local tax-breaks and incentives that have been 
used for policy experimentation. See Bradley, supra note 24, nt 407..08; subpart JtC Stlpra. 
294 See CASES AND f\1ATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNJn' LA\V 79 (George A. Bemunn ct al. 
eds.~ 1992) (noting that ~''[h]armonization' or 'approximation' denotes the proecss by which. through 
community legislation of some sort. the la\vs of the l\fember States on n given m::ttter arc brought mor\! 
closely into line with one another, possibly though not necessarily even made unifonn'?). 
295 Perhaps the most famous expression of this theory \vas n dissent by Justice Louis Brondeis in 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). "It is one of the h3ppy incidents of the federal sys-
tem that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a Jaborotory; and l1y novel so~irJI 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.'' /d. at 311; see also r..1ichacl \'/. 
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHJ. L. REv. 1484,1498 (1987) {book 
review) (arguing that having a large number of states \Viii produce innO\'ation). 
296 See Deborah Jones 1\ienitt. Tlzree Faces of Fcdcra/isn1: Finding a Fomzula for 1he Future. 41 
V AND. L. REv. 1563, 1574 (1994). 
297 See ThE FEDERAUST No. 10, at 77-84 {James t.1ndison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961) {predicting 
this phenomenon); see also Steven Calabresi, Note. A ltfadisonian lntcrpr~ation of/he Equal Proreclion 
Doctrine~ 91 YALE LJ. 1403, 1404 n.4 (1982) (''This has been historically true nnd is just as true todly .... ). 
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we ought to make the best of it.298 But perhaps a false choice is being of.:. 
fered between, on the one hand, a variety of state governments with differ-
entiated political cultures_, each of which permits entrenched majorities to 
cling to power, and, on the other hand, a monolithic national government 
that respects minority rights but imposes a sameness that discourages in-
volvement in politics. The national government can still take steps to pro-
tect minorities while preserving a significant degree of autonomy to the 
states-.299 Indeed, Professor Vicki Jackson argues that the permanence of 
state geographical boundaries promotes tolerance among racial, ethnic, and 
religious groups.300 State lines do not usually correspond to race or relig-
ion. .Maintaining the significance of state governments creates allegiances 
and civic identities that cut across divisive cultural and religious lines. 301 
It would be naive under any circumstances to rely on the political 
process to protect state sovereignty and promote respect of state govern-
ment without intervention from the courts. This is_ particularly true where 
the treaty power is concerned. As argued in subpart IV.B, the political pro-
tections for the states envisioned by the Founders and built into the treaty 
approval process have been worn away. But the treaty negotiation and ap-
proval process is particularly troubling from the standpoint of a conversa-
tional model of democracy.302 Not only is the treaty rocess ''less 
more opaque, The Executive conducts negotiations with little public dis-
closure or media attention, particularly since the advent of "fast-track'' leg-
islation.304 It is no wonder, then, that a sense of frustration drew a veritable 
cross-section of society to protest at the WTO meeting in Seattle. Many felt 
unelected officials were making important decisions in secret. It is this as-
pect of the treaty power that is most destabilizing. 
The Supreme Court's enforcement of federalism limitations upon trea-
ties and other international agreements would not completely solve these 
problems. Nevertheless, it would force both the president and Congress to 
pay more attention to state concerns in the process of negotiation and ratifi-
cation. States would be more likely to assert themselves in the treaty proc-
ess, and this could in tum create a dialogue that would be useful to citizens. 
298 See SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 122.;.23. 
299 See Richard Briffault, .. What About the 'Ism'?'" Normative and Formal Concer11s ;,, Con tempo• 
rary Federalism_, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1303, 1345-46 (1994) (arguing for federalism but noting that local· 
ism may call for federal intervention in some cases); Calabresi, supra note 297, at 1410-11 (arguing for 
a less stringent equal protection approach at tne federal level and an absolute prohibition on discrimina· 
tory laws at the state level). 
300 Jackson; supra note 12, at 2221-22. 
301 ld~ 
302 See generally Bennett~ supra note 286. 
303 Bradley, supra note 24, at 442; see also Friedman, supra note 117, at 147$·59. 
304 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The forces of globalization \viii continue to :put pressure on national 
govenunents to legislate through treaties and international agreements. The 
Court \viii interpret the constitutional status of this legislation in light of the 
Treaty Clause jurisprudence, even though fonnal treaties themselves are be-
coming more rare. If Missouri v. Holland remains good la\v, very little can 
prevent a torrent of international standards from \Viping out state preroga-
tives. 
The inevitable conflict bet\veen the uniqueness of the treaty po,ver and 
the Court's revival of federalism should be resolved in favor of federalism. 
Since the incentives for the political branches at the federal level to protect 
states' rights are fe\v, it \viii be up to the courts to enforce federalism limita-
tions. The most recent Supreme Court decisions establish a firm grounding 
for federalism in the constitutional structure, leaving courts better equipped 
to protect states_' rights. 
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